The content in article XIII to XV is absolutely crucial to get roughly right.
From game theory perspective clear sanctions are extremely important.
I think even more explicity and specifics would be good there. But I could guess that the terms need to be heavily negotiated to pass.
// Regarding the whole core idea that signatories can regulate non-signatories, this seems absolutely wild politically. If the idea centers around a power coalition, then the withdrawal terms seem “undercooked” and the whole idea seems unrealistic to pass in the current era.
I mean, playing devil’s advocat here, what superpower would sign on to shooting itself in the foot like this? Enabling an entity to which it yields its own power, which if successful, from which they can never take the power back?
USSR didn’t even agree to US giving up its nukes to UN council back post-WW2. And current US seem very self-centered as well.
Do you have some estimation of the chances of the withdrawal terms passing?
Thanks for the comment. I think this is definitely one of the places that would both receive lots of negotiation, and where we don’t have particular expertise. Given my lack of expertise, I don’t have much confidence in the particular withdrawal terms.
One of the frames that I think is really important here is that we are imagining this agreement is implemented in a situation where (at least some) world leaders are quite concerned with ASI risk. As such, countries in the agreement do a bunch of non-proliferation-like activities to prevent non-parties from getting AI infrastructure. So the calculus looks like “join the agreement and get access to AI chips to run existing AI models” vs. “don’t join the agreement and either don’t get access to AI chips or be at risk of coalition parties disrupting your AI activities”. That is, I don’t expect ‘refusing to sign’ or withdrawing to be particularly exciting opportunities, given the incentives at play. (and this is more a factor of the overall situation and risk awareness among world leaders, rather than our particular agreement)
Yes, I see. This is exciting work. I hope you collect and receive a lot of feedback on those articles!
My main worry is hat you won’t have buy-in to create an agreement in the first place. That’s what I was trying to point at in the second half of my comment.
Let’s start from the inception of the agreement.
The core idea is a bilateral inception between leading states, after all. Say China wants to adopt this. My question is: Why do you assume US would join? They could just accuse China of trying to slow them down.
But okay, say the (next) president of US is worried about ASI risk and so is China’s leader. How do they pitch giving up power permanently to the rest of the politicians and business leaders that back them? What’s the incentive to adopt this in the first place, before it has strong international backing?
The backlash could also be horrible from parties who do not worry, and who see it as a power grab or a blatant violation of international order. Honestly, even if they agree in spirit, it might be a hard sell as-is.
Trust is hard-won across countries and continents, when you lack a shared framework to build on, even during business as usual. I can say that even from my own humble experience. (In my work I coordinate with stakeholders in up to 15 different countries on a weekly basis.)
The content in article XIII to XV is absolutely crucial to get roughly right.
From game theory perspective clear sanctions are extremely important.
I think even more explicity and specifics would be good there. But I could guess that the terms need to be heavily negotiated to pass.
// Regarding the whole core idea that signatories can regulate non-signatories, this seems absolutely wild politically. If the idea centers around a power coalition, then the withdrawal terms seem “undercooked” and the whole idea seems unrealistic to pass in the current era.
I mean, playing devil’s advocat here, what superpower would sign on to shooting itself in the foot like this? Enabling an entity to which it yields its own power, which if successful, from which they can never take the power back?
USSR didn’t even agree to US giving up its nukes to UN council back post-WW2. And current US seem very self-centered as well.
Do you have some estimation of the chances of the withdrawal terms passing?
Thanks for the comment. I think this is definitely one of the places that would both receive lots of negotiation, and where we don’t have particular expertise. Given my lack of expertise, I don’t have much confidence in the particular withdrawal terms.
One of the frames that I think is really important here is that we are imagining this agreement is implemented in a situation where (at least some) world leaders are quite concerned with ASI risk. As such, countries in the agreement do a bunch of non-proliferation-like activities to prevent non-parties from getting AI infrastructure. So the calculus looks like “join the agreement and get access to AI chips to run existing AI models” vs. “don’t join the agreement and either don’t get access to AI chips or be at risk of coalition parties disrupting your AI activities”. That is, I don’t expect ‘refusing to sign’ or withdrawing to be particularly exciting opportunities, given the incentives at play. (and this is more a factor of the overall situation and risk awareness among world leaders, rather than our particular agreement)
Yes, I see. This is exciting work. I hope you collect and receive a lot of feedback on those articles!
My main worry is hat you won’t have buy-in to create an agreement in the first place. That’s what I was trying to point at in the second half of my comment.
Let’s start from the inception of the agreement.
The core idea is a bilateral inception between leading states, after all. Say China wants to adopt this. My question is: Why do you assume US would join? They could just accuse China of trying to slow them down.
But okay, say the (next) president of US is worried about ASI risk and so is China’s leader. How do they pitch giving up power permanently to the rest of the politicians and business leaders that back them? What’s the incentive to adopt this in the first place, before it has strong international backing?
The backlash could also be horrible from parties who do not worry, and who see it as a power grab or a blatant violation of international order. Honestly, even if they agree in spirit, it might be a hard sell as-is.
Trust is hard-won across countries and continents, when you lack a shared framework to build on, even during business as usual. I can say that even from my own humble experience. (In my work I coordinate with stakeholders in up to 15 different countries on a weekly basis.)