The argument is not that generic computations are likely simulated, it’s about our specific situation—being a newly intelligent species arising in an empty universe. So simulationists would take the ‘rare’ branch of your trilemma.
If you’re stating that generic intelligence was not likely simulated, but generic intelligence in our situationwaslikely simulated...
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
(As an aside, this does somewhat conflate ‘intelligence’ and ‘computation’; I am assuming that intelligence requires at least some non-zero amount of computation. It’s good to make this assumption explicit I suppose.)
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
Sure. I just think we have enough evidence to overrule the principle, in the form of sensory experiences apparently belonging to a member of a newly-arisen intelligent species. Overruling mediocrity principles with evidence is common.
The argument is not that generic computations are likely simulated, it’s about our specific situation—being a newly intelligent species arising in an empty universe. So simulationists would take the ‘rare’ branch of your trilemma.
Interesting.
If you’re stating that generic intelligence was not likely simulated, but generic intelligence in our situation was likely simulated...
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
(As an aside, this does somewhat conflate ‘intelligence’ and ‘computation’; I am assuming that intelligence requires at least some non-zero amount of computation. It’s good to make this assumption explicit I suppose.)
Sure. I just think we have enough evidence to overrule the principle, in the form of sensory experiences apparently belonging to a member of a newly-arisen intelligent species. Overruling mediocrity principles with evidence is common.