It should be possible to find natural experiments as local laws change, but I don’t know of any studies. And it’s _very_ hard to study longer-term effects, as such laws tend to change because of demographic changes, not in advance of them.
I think your motivational model for landlords is fairly accurate—they would prefer to leave a unit empty over renting to a (percieved) risk. In the longer term, this also applies to the supply of rental housing and whether people choose to become (or cease to be) landlords. If the income for a property doesn’t make up for the hassle and expense, maybe the landlord is better off converting to a condo or meth factory.
I think your risk and cost estimates are somewhat naive. Even if evictions are not legally restricted, they never get truly easy. In the case of “problem tenants”, the eviction can increase the chance or magnitude of damage: revenge destruction is not unheard-of (it _is_ uncommon, but perhaps wouldn’t be if more impulsive tenants were more easily moved from room to room). More importantly, the damage is done by the time the decision to evict is made. Evicting a problem tenant doesn’t undo the expense, it just stops the bleeding.
I suspect it will remain the case, regardless of policy or law, that the easiest eviction is not to have rented in the first place. And the easiest way not to take a loss on rental property is not to be a landlord in the first place.
I don’t know any good solutions, unfortunately. There are partial solutions, for some populations, but they can make it worse for other groups. Required renter’s insurance that indemnifies the landlord is a possibility—GREAT for those who appear risky to the landlord but have a solid track record that the insurer can see. Crappy for the reverse—those who appear worse than they are to the insurance company.
Fractional ownership (condo model, but with landlord as part-owner) is another—instead of a deposit, require an investment of a significant percentage of the value. Which you get back (along with capital gains or losses) from the next tenant/owner, not from the landlord. Again, GREAT for a group of people with some financial resources but not enough to own outright. And unworkable for most of the poor.
Just relaxing housing codes may be an economically-viable solution—the landlord takes less risk if the apartment is _already_ pretty damaged. But it’s well outside the overton window for social acceptance—“slumlord” is a strong epithet.
It should be possible to find natural experiments as local laws change, but I don’t know of any studies. And it’s _very_ hard to study longer-term effects, as such laws tend to change because of demographic changes, not in advance of them.
I think your motivational model for landlords is fairly accurate—they would prefer to leave a unit empty over renting to a (percieved) risk. In the longer term, this also applies to the supply of rental housing and whether people choose to become (or cease to be) landlords. If the income for a property doesn’t make up for the hassle and expense, maybe the landlord is better off converting to a condo or meth factory.
I think your risk and cost estimates are somewhat naive. Even if evictions are not legally restricted, they never get truly easy. In the case of “problem tenants”, the eviction can increase the chance or magnitude of damage: revenge destruction is not unheard-of (it _is_ uncommon, but perhaps wouldn’t be if more impulsive tenants were more easily moved from room to room). More importantly, the damage is done by the time the decision to evict is made. Evicting a problem tenant doesn’t undo the expense, it just stops the bleeding.
I suspect it will remain the case, regardless of policy or law, that the easiest eviction is not to have rented in the first place. And the easiest way not to take a loss on rental property is not to be a landlord in the first place.
I don’t know any good solutions, unfortunately. There are partial solutions, for some populations, but they can make it worse for other groups. Required renter’s insurance that indemnifies the landlord is a possibility—GREAT for those who appear risky to the landlord but have a solid track record that the insurer can see. Crappy for the reverse—those who appear worse than they are to the insurance company.
Fractional ownership (condo model, but with landlord as part-owner) is another—instead of a deposit, require an investment of a significant percentage of the value. Which you get back (along with capital gains or losses) from the next tenant/owner, not from the landlord. Again, GREAT for a group of people with some financial resources but not enough to own outright. And unworkable for most of the poor.
Just relaxing housing codes may be an economically-viable solution—the landlord takes less risk if the apartment is _already_ pretty damaged. But it’s well outside the overton window for social acceptance—“slumlord” is a strong epithet.