We may be moving too fast when we expunge metaphysics from our web-of-belief. Say you believe that all beliefs should pay rent in anticipated experiences. What experiences do you anticipate only because you hold this belief? If there aren’t any, then this seems awfully like a metaphysical belief. In other words, it might not be feasible to avoid metaphysics completely. Even if my specific example fails, the metaphysicians claim to have some that succeed. Studying metaphysics has been on my to-do list for a long time (if only to be secure in my belief that we don’t need to bother with it), but for some reason I never actually do it.
(LessWrong implicitly assumes certain metaphysics pretty often, e.g. when they talk about “simulation”, “measure”, “reality fluid”, and so on; it seems to me that “anthropics” is a place where experience meets metaphysics. My preferred metaphysic for anthropics comes from decision theory, and my intuitions about decision theory come to a small extent from theological metaphysics and to a larger extent from theoretical computer science, e.g. algorithmic probability theory, which I figured is a metaphysic for the same reason that monadology is a metaphysic. ISTM that even if metaphysics aren’t as fundamental as they pretend to be, they’re still useful and perhaps necessary for organizing our experiences and intuitions so as to predict/understand prospective/counterfactual experiences in highly unusual circumstances (e.g. simulations).)
Hm… one rationale for such a designation might be: “A ‘metaphysic’ is a model that is at least one level of abstraction/generalization higher than my most abstract/general model; people who use different models than me seem to have higher-level models than I deem justified given their limited evidence; thus those higher-level models are metaphysical.” Or something? I should think about this more.
Your theory is much nicer than mine. Mine essentially amounts to people believing “I understand reality, your beliefs are scientifically justified, he endorses metaphysical hogwash.” Further, at least since the days of the Vienna Circle, some scientifically-minded individuals have used ‘metaphysics’ as a slur. (I mean, at least some of the Logical Positivists seriously claimed that metaphysical terms were nonsense, that is, having neither truth-value nor meaning.)
I have read Yudkowsky discuss matters of qualia and free will. This site contains metaphysics, straight up. I assume that anyone who dismisses metaphysics is either dismissing folk-usage of the term or is taking too much pride in their models of reality (that latter part does somewhat match your stipulative explanation.)
(Oh, I’m not sure if your joke was intentional, but I still think it is funny that some possible humans would reject metaphysics for being ‘models’ which are too ‘abstract’, ‘of higher-level’, and not ‘justified’ given the current ‘evidence’.)
Agreed that Will’s theory is nicer than yours. That said, with emphasis on “some,” I think yours is true. Although the Christians I know are far more likely to use “religion” to refer to Christianity. (Still more so are the Catholics I know inclined to use “religion” to refer to Catholicism.)
I was just referring to some Protestants who will share such statements as “Christianity isn’t a religion, it’s a relationship” or “I hate religion too. That’s why I believe in Jesus.” Of course, most Protestants do not do this.
Ah, I see. The Christians I know are more prone to statements like “Religion is important, because it teaches people about the importance of Jesus’ love.”
Just came across a comment by Deogolwulf in response to a comment on one of Mencius Moldbug’s posts:
“I would say that all things are ultimately reduceable to quarks”
Say it if you like, but if you are to be rationally coherent, you must believe that your proposition also reduces to quarks, and therefore, given that you believe that quarks are intrinsically meaningless, and given that “nothing enters in at a different level”, you must hold your own proposition to be fundamentally meaningless, and therefore not actually a proposition at all, and therefore that your non-propositional emittance is fundamentally without truth. But why then assert it? Do you ever consider that you are just trying irrationally to put yourself at the furthest remove from your former beliefs? Perhaps that is the source of your aversion to metaphysical philosophy which no rational-thinking animal can ever avoid even should he perversely wish it — any rational consideration of your own beliefs might reveal their nonsensical nature to you.
“It may be impractical to think at the quark-level, but that is the actual level reality operates on and nothing enters in at a different level.”
Could you think of any way to test or affirm this strange belief of yours even empirically-scientifically, let alone quarkly? Of course not, nor could there be any such way. Besides, it seems that, according to your own hazy brand of positivism-cum-physicalism, “levels of reality” are not ontologically objective, let alone empirically-scientifically knowable as such, and thus, by your own lights, it is meaningless to speak of them. But perhaps, after all, you do believe that the levels of reality of which you speak are ontologically objective, or that quarks have intrinsic meaning, in which case, slipping from your positivism, perhaps you would have some philosophical defence of these ideas, along with some defence of the bold equation of reality with physicality. But, once again, you would have to enter the metaphysical-philosophical realm which you yourself claim to be rubbish, and why enter it if you believe it to be so — or is all this just pseudo-scientific and scientistic posing?
I couldn’t find the original on a quick Google, but:
The Master was speaking in the public square about the illusory nature of reality, when a bull got away from his handler and charged the crowd. The crowd scattered in fear, all but a young child who had been learning at the master’s feet, who had absorbed some of his wisdom and was therefore unafraid.
Afterwards, the Master approached the child’s trampled body and, saddened, asked “Why did you not run?” The child replied, with difficulty, “But Master, had you not just been teaching us that the bull was just an illusion? What should I have to fear from an illusion?” ″Yes, child,” he replied. “The bull is an illusion. But so are you.”
At that moment, the child died.
Which is to say, believing that something can be entirely explained in terms of something else doesn’t absolve me from the need to deal with it. Even if I and the bull and my preference to remain alive can all be entirely captured by the sufficiently precise specification of a set of quarks, it doesn’t follow that there exists no such person, no such bull, or no such preference.
The argument was a meta-level undermining argument supporting the necessity of metaphysical reasoning (of the exact sort that you’re engaging in in your comment);—it wasn’t an argument about the merits of reductionism. That would likely have been clearer had I included more context; my apologies.
Also, metaphysical reasoning is often necessary, agreed.
Sadly, I often find it necessary in response to metaphysical reasoning introduced to situations without a clear sense of what it’s achieving and whether that end can be achieved without it. In this sense it’s rather like lawyers.
Not that I’m advocating eliminating all the lawyers, not even a little. Lawyers are useful. They’re even useful for things other than defending oneself from other lawyers.
But I’ve also seen situations made worse because one party brought in a lawyer without a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of involving lawyers in that situation.
I suspect that a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of metaphysical reasoning is equally useful.
Deogolwulf is the sort of fellow who uses ‘proposition’ while obviously meaning ‘statement’. Also, some of the first paragraph is pure unreflective sophistry. Still, the second half:
Could you think of any way to test or affirm this strange belief of yours even empirically-scientifically, let alone quarkly? Of course not, nor could there be any such way.
Following this epistemic attack, I am imagining Deogolwulf holding up a mirror to TGGP’s face and stating “No, TGGP, you are the metaphysics.”
When someone on Lesswrong uses the term ‘simulation’, they are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B). (This particular subject often falls under the part of metaphysics known as ontology.)
Correct me if I’m wrong, but “They are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B).” and “They are probably making some implicit claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B)” mean exactly the same thing.
They do happen to mean the same thing. This is because the question “What does it mean for some y to be an x?” is a metaphysical question.
“They are probably making some aesthetic claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)” and “They are probably making some claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)” also mean the same thing.
Come to that, they both probably mean the same thing as “They are probably making some implicit claims about how some object(B) differs from some other object (A) it simulates,” which eliminates the reference to meaning as well.
Say you believe that all beliefs should pay rent in anticipated experiences. What experiences do you anticipate only because you hold this belief?
Well, that’s a “should” statement, so we cash it out in terms of desirable outcomes, e.g.:
People who spend more time elaborating on their non-anticipatory beliefs will not get as much benefit from doing so as people who spend more time updating anticipatory beliefs.
If two people (or groups, or disciplines) ostensibly aim at the same goals, and deploy similar amounts of resources and effort; but one focuses its efforts with anticipation-controlling beliefs while the other relies on non-anticipation-controlling beliefs, then the former will achieve the goals more than the latter. (Examples could be found in charities with the goal of saving lives; or in martial arts schools with the goal of winning fights.)
Say you believe that all beliefs should pay rent in anticipated experiences. What experiences do you anticipate only because you hold this belief?
I anticipate to experience more efficient thinking, because I will have to remember less and think about less topics, while achieving the same results.
Studying metaphysics has been on my to-do list for a long time (if only to be secure in my belief that we don’t need to bother with it), but for some reason I never actually do it.
What do you anticipate to experience after studying metaphysics (besides being able to signal deep wisdom)?
What do you anticipate to experience after studying metaphysics (besides being able to signal deep wisdom)?
I anticipate understanding the abstract nature of justification, thus allowing me to devise better-justified institutions. I anticipate understanding cosmology and its role in justification, thus allowing me to understand how to transcend the contingent/universal duality of justification. I anticipate understanding infinities and their actuality/non-actuality and thus what role infinities play in justification. I anticipate graving new values on new tables with the knowledge gleaned from a greater understanding of justification—I anticipate seeing what both epistemology and morality are special cases and approximations of, and I anticipate using my knowledge of that higher-level structure to create new values. And so on.
That too, yes. Algorithmic probability is an example of a field that is pretty mathematical and pretty metaphysical. It’s the intellectual descendant of Leibniz’s monadology. Computationalism is a mathematical metaphysic.
By “metaphysic” I mean a high-level model for phenomena or concepts that you can’t immediately falsify because, though the model explains all of the phenomena you are aware of, the model is also very general. E.g., if you look at a computer processor you can say “ah, it is performing a computation”, and this constrains your anticipations quite a bit; but if you look at a desk or a chair and say “ah, it is performing a computation”, then you’ve gotten into metaphysical territory: you can abstract away the concept of computation and apply it to basically everything, but it’s unclear whether or not doing so means that computation is very fundamental, or if you’re just overapplying a contingent model. Sometimes when theorizing it’s necessary to choose a certain metaphysic: e.g., I will say that I am an instance of a computation, and thus that a computer could make an exact simulation of me and I would exist twice as much, thus making me less surprised to find myself as me rather than someone else. Now, such a line of reasoning requires quite a few metaphysical assumptions—assumptions about the generalizability of certain models that we’re not sure do or don’t break down—but metaphysical speculation is the best we can do because we don’t have a way of simulating people or switching conscious experience flows with other people.
That’s one possible explanation of “metaphysic”/”metaphysics”, but honestly I should look into the relevant metaphilosophy—it’s very possible that my explanation is essentially wrong or misleading in some way.
Why would generality be opposed to falsifiability? Wouldn’t having a model be more general lead to easier falsifiability, given that the model should apply more broadly?
In order to tell whether something is performing a computation, you try to find some way to get the object to exhibit the computation it is (allegedly) making. So—if I understand correctly—then a model is metaphysical, in the things you write, if applying it to a particular phenomenon requires an interpretation step which may or may not be known to be possible. How does this differ from any other model, except that you’re allowing yourself to be sloppy with it?
If you just replace “metaphysic” by “model”, “metaphysical assumptions” by “assumptions about our models and their applicability”, “metaphysical speculation” by “speculations based on our models”, I think the things you’re trying to say become clearer. If a bit less fancy-sounding.
If the thing I understood is the thing you tried to say.
I could replace all my uses of the word “metaphysical” with “sloppily-general”, I guess, but I’m not sure it has quite the right connotations, and “metaphysical” is already the standard terminology. “Metaphysical” is vague in a somewhat precise way that “sloppily-general” isn’t. I appreciate the general need for down-to-earth language, but I also don’t want to consent to the norm of encouraging people to take pains to write in such a way as to be understood by the greatest common factor of readers.
“X is a metaphysic” becomes “X is somehow a model (of something), but I’m not sure how”.
“Y is metaphysical” becomes “Y is about or related to a model (somehow)”.
I assume my understanding is correct, since you didn’t correct it.
“sloppily-general” is then indeed kind of far from the intended meaning, but that’s just because it’s a terrible coinage.
Elsewhere, somebody posted a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of metaphysics. They say right in the intro that they haven’t found a good way to define it. The Wikipedia article on metaphysics’s body implies a different definition than its opening paragraph. In common parlance, it’s used for some vague spiritualish thing. And your definition is different from all of these. Do you think that the term could reasonably be expected to be understood the way you intended it to?
“Metaphysical” isn’t vague in a somewhat precise way. It isn’t even evocative, as its convoluted etymology prevents even that. It’s just vague and used by philosophers.
The greatest common factor of readers isn’t even here. The point is more to be understood by readers at all. Don’t make your writing more obscure than it needs to be. Hard concepts are hard enough as is, without making the fricking idea of “somehow a model” worth 3 hours’ worth of discussion.
Metaphysics can’t even be a thing in a web of belief! It’s more a box for a bunch of things, with a tag that says “Ooo”. Unless you want to define it otherwise, or I’m more confused than I think I am. So the category only makes sense if you want to use it to describe your feelings for some given subject. Why would that be a good way to frame a field of study?
That’s what I suspect is problem with metaphysics; not the things in the box, which are arbitrary, rather that the box messes up your filing system.
We may be moving too fast when we expunge metaphysics from our web-of-belief. Say you believe that all beliefs should pay rent in anticipated experiences. What experiences do you anticipate only because you hold this belief? If there aren’t any, then this seems awfully like a metaphysical belief. In other words, it might not be feasible to avoid metaphysics completely. Even if my specific example fails, the metaphysicians claim to have some that succeed. Studying metaphysics has been on my to-do list for a long time (if only to be secure in my belief that we don’t need to bother with it), but for some reason I never actually do it.
(LessWrong implicitly assumes certain metaphysics pretty often, e.g. when they talk about “simulation”, “measure”, “reality fluid”, and so on; it seems to me that “anthropics” is a place where experience meets metaphysics. My preferred metaphysic for anthropics comes from decision theory, and my intuitions about decision theory come to a small extent from theological metaphysics and to a larger extent from theoretical computer science, e.g. algorithmic probability theory, which I figured is a metaphysic for the same reason that monadology is a metaphysic. ISTM that even if metaphysics aren’t as fundamental as they pretend to be, they’re still useful and perhaps necessary for organizing our experiences and intuitions so as to predict/understand prospective/counterfactual experiences in highly unusual circumstances (e.g. simulations).)
When some Lesswrong-users use ‘metaphysics’, they mean other people’s metaphysics. This is much like how some Christians use the term ‘religion’.
Hm… one rationale for such a designation might be: “A ‘metaphysic’ is a model that is at least one level of abstraction/generalization higher than my most abstract/general model; people who use different models than me seem to have higher-level models than I deem justified given their limited evidence; thus those higher-level models are metaphysical.” Or something? I should think about this more.
Your theory is much nicer than mine. Mine essentially amounts to people believing “I understand reality, your beliefs are scientifically justified, he endorses metaphysical hogwash.” Further, at least since the days of the Vienna Circle, some scientifically-minded individuals have used ‘metaphysics’ as a slur. (I mean, at least some of the Logical Positivists seriously claimed that metaphysical terms were nonsense, that is, having neither truth-value nor meaning.)
I have read Yudkowsky discuss matters of qualia and free will. This site contains metaphysics, straight up. I assume that anyone who dismisses metaphysics is either dismissing folk-usage of the term or is taking too much pride in their models of reality (that latter part does somewhat match your stipulative explanation.)
(Oh, I’m not sure if your joke was intentional, but I still think it is funny that some possible humans would reject metaphysics for being ‘models’ which are too ‘abstract’, ‘of higher-level’, and not ‘justified’ given the current ‘evidence’.)
Agreed that Will’s theory is nicer than yours. That said, with emphasis on “some,” I think yours is true. Although the Christians I know are far more likely to use “religion” to refer to Christianity. (Still more so are the Catholics I know inclined to use “religion” to refer to Catholicism.)
I was just referring to some Protestants who will share such statements as “Christianity isn’t a religion, it’s a relationship” or “I hate religion too. That’s why I believe in Jesus.” Of course, most Protestants do not do this.
Ah, I see. The Christians I know are more prone to statements like “Religion is important, because it teaches people about the importance of Jesus’ love.”
Just came across a comment by Deogolwulf in response to a comment on one of Mencius Moldbug’s posts:
Oh, snap!
I couldn’t find the original on a quick Google, but:
Which is to say, believing that something can be entirely explained in terms of something else doesn’t absolve me from the need to deal with it. Even if I and the bull and my preference to remain alive can all be entirely captured by the sufficiently precise specification of a set of quarks, it doesn’t follow that there exists no such person, no such bull, or no such preference.
The argument was a meta-level undermining argument supporting the necessity of metaphysical reasoning (of the exact sort that you’re engaging in in your comment);—it wasn’t an argument about the merits of reductionism. That would likely have been clearer had I included more context; my apologies.
(nods) Context is often useful, agreed.
Also, metaphysical reasoning is often necessary, agreed.
Sadly, I often find it necessary in response to metaphysical reasoning introduced to situations without a clear sense of what it’s achieving and whether that end can be achieved without it.
In this sense it’s rather like lawyers.
Not that I’m advocating eliminating all the lawyers, not even a little.
Lawyers are useful.
They’re even useful for things other than defending oneself from other lawyers.
But I’ve also seen situations made worse because one party brought in a lawyer without a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of involving lawyers in that situation.
I suspect that a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of metaphysical reasoning is equally useful.
Where is that quote from, out of curiosity ?
If I could remember that, I probably could have found it on Google in the first place.
...fair enough. I tried looking on Google, and couldn’t find it either. Perhaps your quote is original enough for you to claim authorship :-/
Perhaps? I’m fairly sure I read it somewhere, but my memory is unreliable.
Deogolwulf is the sort of fellow who uses ‘proposition’ while obviously meaning ‘statement’. Also, some of the first paragraph is pure unreflective sophistry. Still, the second half:
Following this epistemic attack, I am imagining Deogolwulf holding up a mirror to TGGP’s face and stating “No, TGGP, you are the metaphysics.”
I think part of the problem is different scenes of the word “reduce”. Consider the following two statements:
1) All things ultimately reduce to quarks (nitpick: and leptons)
2) Quarks and leptons ultimately reduce to quantum wave functions.
3) Quantum wave functions ultimately reduce to mathematics.
4) All mathematics ultimately reduces to the ZFC axioms.
Notice that all these statements are true (I’m not quite sure about the first one) for slightly different values of “reduces”.
What?
When someone on Lesswrong uses the term ‘simulation’, they are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B). (This particular subject often falls under the part of metaphysics known as ontology.)
The same applies to usage of most terms.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but “They are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B).” and “They are probably making some implicit claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B)” mean exactly the same thing.
They do happen to mean the same thing. This is because the question “What does it mean for some y to be an x?” is a metaphysical question.
“They are probably making some aesthetic claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)” and “They are probably making some claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)” also mean the same thing.
Come to that, they both probably mean the same thing as “They are probably making some implicit claims about how some object(B) differs from some other object (A) it simulates,” which eliminates the reference to meaning as well.
Well, that’s a “should” statement, so we cash it out in terms of desirable outcomes, e.g.:
People who spend more time elaborating on their non-anticipatory beliefs will not get as much benefit from doing so as people who spend more time updating anticipatory beliefs.
If two people (or groups, or disciplines) ostensibly aim at the same goals, and deploy similar amounts of resources and effort; but one focuses its efforts with anticipation-controlling beliefs while the other relies on non-anticipation-controlling beliefs, then the former will achieve the goals more than the latter. (Examples could be found in charities with the goal of saving lives; or in martial arts schools with the goal of winning fights.)
Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom—EY
Can you give any examples of modern metaphysics being useful?
Ontology begat early AI, which begat object-oriented programming.
I anticipate to experience more efficient thinking, because I will have to remember less and think about less topics, while achieving the same results.
What do you anticipate to experience after studying metaphysics (besides being able to signal deep wisdom)?
I anticipate understanding the abstract nature of justification, thus allowing me to devise better-justified institutions. I anticipate understanding cosmology and its role in justification, thus allowing me to understand how to transcend the contingent/universal duality of justification. I anticipate understanding infinities and their actuality/non-actuality and thus what role infinities play in justification. I anticipate graving new values on new tables with the knowledge gleaned from a greater understanding of justification—I anticipate seeing what both epistemology and morality are special cases and approximations of, and I anticipate using my knowledge of that higher-level structure to create new values. And so on.
You might be better off studying mathematics, then.
That too, yes. Algorithmic probability is an example of a field that is pretty mathematical and pretty metaphysical. It’s the intellectual descendant of Leibniz’s monadology. Computationalism is a mathematical metaphysic.
If you would be so kind as to try and tell me what you mean by “metaphysic”, I would be much less confused.
By “metaphysic” I mean a high-level model for phenomena or concepts that you can’t immediately falsify because, though the model explains all of the phenomena you are aware of, the model is also very general. E.g., if you look at a computer processor you can say “ah, it is performing a computation”, and this constrains your anticipations quite a bit; but if you look at a desk or a chair and say “ah, it is performing a computation”, then you’ve gotten into metaphysical territory: you can abstract away the concept of computation and apply it to basically everything, but it’s unclear whether or not doing so means that computation is very fundamental, or if you’re just overapplying a contingent model. Sometimes when theorizing it’s necessary to choose a certain metaphysic: e.g., I will say that I am an instance of a computation, and thus that a computer could make an exact simulation of me and I would exist twice as much, thus making me less surprised to find myself as me rather than someone else. Now, such a line of reasoning requires quite a few metaphysical assumptions—assumptions about the generalizability of certain models that we’re not sure do or don’t break down—but metaphysical speculation is the best we can do because we don’t have a way of simulating people or switching conscious experience flows with other people.
That’s one possible explanation of “metaphysic”/”metaphysics”, but honestly I should look into the relevant metaphilosophy—it’s very possible that my explanation is essentially wrong or misleading in some way.
Why would generality be opposed to falsifiability? Wouldn’t having a model be more general lead to easier falsifiability, given that the model should apply more broadly?
In order to tell whether something is performing a computation, you try to find some way to get the object to exhibit the computation it is (allegedly) making. So—if I understand correctly—then a model is metaphysical, in the things you write, if applying it to a particular phenomenon requires an interpretation step which may or may not be known to be possible. How does this differ from any other model, except that you’re allowing yourself to be sloppy with it?
If you just replace “metaphysic” by “model”, “metaphysical assumptions” by “assumptions about our models and their applicability”, “metaphysical speculation” by “speculations based on our models”, I think the things you’re trying to say become clearer. If a bit less fancy-sounding.
If the thing I understood is the thing you tried to say.
I could replace all my uses of the word “metaphysical” with “sloppily-general”, I guess, but I’m not sure it has quite the right connotations, and “metaphysical” is already the standard terminology. “Metaphysical” is vague in a somewhat precise way that “sloppily-general” isn’t. I appreciate the general need for down-to-earth language, but I also don’t want to consent to the norm of encouraging people to take pains to write in such a way as to be understood by the greatest common factor of readers.
“X is a metaphysic” becomes “X is somehow a model (of something), but I’m not sure how”. “Y is metaphysical” becomes “Y is about or related to a model (somehow)”. I assume my understanding is correct, since you didn’t correct it. “sloppily-general” is then indeed kind of far from the intended meaning, but that’s just because it’s a terrible coinage.
Elsewhere, somebody posted a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of metaphysics. They say right in the intro that they haven’t found a good way to define it. The Wikipedia article on metaphysics’s body implies a different definition than its opening paragraph. In common parlance, it’s used for some vague spiritualish thing. And your definition is different from all of these. Do you think that the term could reasonably be expected to be understood the way you intended it to?
“Metaphysical” isn’t vague in a somewhat precise way. It isn’t even evocative, as its convoluted etymology prevents even that. It’s just vague and used by philosophers.
The greatest common factor of readers isn’t even here. The point is more to be understood by readers at all. Don’t make your writing more obscure than it needs to be. Hard concepts are hard enough as is, without making the fricking idea of “somehow a model” worth 3 hours’ worth of discussion.
Sorry, I was just too lazy to correct it. Still too lazy.
I give up. Good night.
Metaphysics can’t even be a thing in a web of belief! It’s more a box for a bunch of things, with a tag that says “Ooo”. Unless you want to define it otherwise, or I’m more confused than I think I am. So the category only makes sense if you want to use it to describe your feelings for some given subject. Why would that be a good way to frame a field of study?
That’s what I suspect is problem with metaphysics; not the things in the box, which are arbitrary, rather that the box messes up your filing system.