As a reductionist, I view the universe as nothing more than particles/forces/quantum fields/static event graph. Everything that is or was comes from simple rules down at the bottom. I agree with Eliezer regarding many-worlds versus copenhagen.
With this as my frame of reference, Searle’s argument is trivially bogus, as every person (including myself) is obviously a Chinese Room. If a person can be considered ‘conscious’, then so can some running algorithm on a Turing machine of sufficient size. If no Turing machine program exists that can be considered conscious when run, then people aren’t conscious either.
I’ve never needed more than this, and I find the Chinese Room argument to be one of those areas where philosophy is an unambiguously ‘diseased discipline’.
As a reductionist, I view the universe as nothing more than particles/forces/quantum fields/static event graph. Everything that is or was comes from simple rules down at the bottom. I agree with Eliezer regarding many-worlds versus copenhagen.
With this as my frame of reference, Searle’s argument is trivially bogus, as every person (including myself) is obviously a Chinese Room. If a person can be considered ‘conscious’, then so can some running algorithm on a Turing machine of sufficient size. If no Turing machine program exists that can be considered conscious when run, then people aren’t conscious either.
I’ve never needed more than this, and I find the Chinese Room argument to be one of those areas where philosophy is an unambiguously ‘diseased discipline’.
Reductionism doesn’t imply that, behaviour implies that.
Please clarify/reword your statement; I can’t figure out what you’re trying to say. The word “that” is almost completely unspecified.