I think if M isn’t “really mental”, like there is no world representation, it shouldn’t be included in M. I’m guessing depending on the method of encryption, keys might be checkable. If they are not checkable there’s a pigeonhole argument that almost all (short) keys would decrypt to noise. Idk if it’s possible to “encrypt two minds at once” intentionally with homomorphic encryption.
And yeah, if there isn’t a list of minds in R, then it’s hard for g to be efficiently computable, as it would be a search. That’s part of what makes homomorphically encrypted consciousness paradoxical, and what makes possibility C worth considering.
Regarding subjective existence of subjective states: I think if you codify subjective states then you can ask questions like “which subjective states believe other subjective states exist?”. Since it is a belief similar to other beliefs.
When I said “subjective existence” I’ve meant some model where we don’t need a list of minds or exhaustive search for minds to make them real. After all the brain has its own computing power and requiring additional compute or data to make subjective experiences associated with its computations real looks extraneous. Interactions of a mind with our world, on the other hand, seem crucial for our ability to determine its existence.
BTW, thank you for laying out all this in such detail. It makes reasoning much more focused.
I think if M isn’t “really mental”, like there is no world representation, it shouldn’t be included in M. I’m guessing depending on the method of encryption, keys might be checkable. If they are not checkable there’s a pigeonhole argument that almost all (short) keys would decrypt to noise. Idk if it’s possible to “encrypt two minds at once” intentionally with homomorphic encryption.
And yeah, if there isn’t a list of minds in R, then it’s hard for g to be efficiently computable, as it would be a search. That’s part of what makes homomorphically encrypted consciousness paradoxical, and what makes possibility C worth considering.
Regarding subjective existence of subjective states: I think if you codify subjective states then you can ask questions like “which subjective states believe other subjective states exist?”. Since it is a belief similar to other beliefs.
When I said “subjective existence” I’ve meant some model where we don’t need a list of minds or exhaustive search for minds to make them real. After all the brain has its own computing power and requiring additional compute or data to make subjective experiences associated with its computations real looks extraneous. Interactions of a mind with our world, on the other hand, seem crucial for our ability to determine its existence.
BTW, thank you for laying out all this in such detail. It makes reasoning much more focused.