Informally, every possible physical state has a unique corresponding mental state. Formally:
My first pass response to this is: Yes, there’s a unique mental state for each physical state, but the aspects of that mental state can be partitioned from each other in ways that are computationally intractable to un-partition. The mapping you use from raw physics or reality to whatever understanding you use it for[1] is a function not a primitive, and in this case that function could place you on either side of an informational partition[2] (depending on whether the mapping function does something like encrypts your viewing portal/perspective). Analogous to looking at an object from different perspectives, which under normal circumstances would be connectable efficiently, but here aren’t.
Normally you can just privilege the simpler mapping function and get everything you’d want, but your simple mapping function isn’t physics, it’s viewing physics from a direction that looks simpler to you. If this is right:
A misses that the homomorphic mind is ‘real’ from a different perspective, there’s just more than one direction to be omniscient into the universe from
The somewhat shaky assumptions B makes aren’t required
I don’t quite think C’s framing fits, it’s not that reality exceeds physics, it’s that physics isn’t informationally/computationally interconnected in a way that makes any single perspective capable of efficiently getting all the interesting information.
I think some of Wolfram’s work on the Ruliad gave me some of the intuitions I’m using here, if this feels worth digging into.
Right so, by step 4 I’m not trying to assume that h is computationally tractable; the homomorphic case goes to show that it’s probably not in general.
With respect to C, perhaps I’m not verbally expressing it that well, but the thing you are thinking of, where there is some omniscient perspective that includes “more than” just the low level of physics (where the “more than” could be certain informational/computational interconnections) would be an instance. Something like, “there is a way to construct an omniscient perspective, it just isn’t going to be straightforwardly derivable from the physical state”.
Thanks for the link to Wolfram’s work. I listened to an interview with him on Lex I think, and wasn’t inspired to investigate further. However what you have provided does seem worthwhile looking into.
My first pass response to this is: Yes, there’s a unique mental state for each physical state, but the aspects of that mental state can be partitioned from each other in ways that are computationally intractable to un-partition. The mapping you use from raw physics or reality to whatever understanding you use it for[1] is a function not a primitive, and in this case that function could place you on either side of an informational partition[2] (depending on whether the mapping function does something like encrypts your viewing portal/perspective). Analogous to looking at an object from different perspectives, which under normal circumstances would be connectable efficiently, but here aren’t.
Normally you can just privilege the simpler mapping function and get everything you’d want, but your simple mapping function isn’t physics, it’s viewing physics from a direction that looks simpler to you. If this is right:
A misses that the homomorphic mind is ‘real’ from a different perspective, there’s just more than one direction to be omniscient into the universe from
The somewhat shaky assumptions B makes aren’t required
I don’t quite think C’s framing fits, it’s not that reality exceeds physics, it’s that physics isn’t informationally/computationally interconnected in a way that makes any single perspective capable of efficiently getting all the interesting information.
I think some of Wolfram’s work on the Ruliad gave me some of the intuitions I’m using here, if this feels worth digging into.
Itself a computational/informational process, which it looks like you’re not staring right at in this post?
The function could even give you access to both sides of the partition, with some complexity addition.
Right so, by step 4 I’m not trying to assume that h is computationally tractable; the homomorphic case goes to show that it’s probably not in general.
With respect to C, perhaps I’m not verbally expressing it that well, but the thing you are thinking of, where there is some omniscient perspective that includes “more than” just the low level of physics (where the “more than” could be certain informational/computational interconnections) would be an instance. Something like, “there is a way to construct an omniscient perspective, it just isn’t going to be straightforwardly derivable from the physical state”.
Thanks for the link to Wolfram’s work. I listened to an interview with him on Lex I think, and wasn’t inspired to investigate further. However what you have provided does seem worthwhile looking into.