What has particularly struck me in reading on this topic is the degree to which statements of fact or logic are often interwoven with rhetorical style that serves to sway opinion by means other than reason. This can be as subtle as writing with a tone of definitive finality or condescension, or as blatant as ridiculing opponents’ positions. I suspect writers are often unaware they are doing this, probably including myself.
I have been acting for a while as if this was one of the more important things to mitigate in communication about difficult topics. There’s recently been vigorous debate on lesswrong about whether that’s the case. I notice myself being inclined to shout “see?” about this paragraph. I am watering down to this comment, partly because of that policy itself, and partly because the quoted claim is not clearly well enough justified to conclude the case about whether moderating impulses towards confident wording is useful. I have a sensation I mentally associate with confirmation bias around the topic; my hunch is I’m still right, but I’m pretty sure I don’t have discrete evidence of that, only a gestalt/pile of inconclusive bayesian evidence with sourcing flaws from everyday interaction.
I have been acting for a while as if this was one of the more important things to mitigate in communication about difficult topics. There’s recently been vigorous debate on lesswrong about whether that’s the case. I notice myself being inclined to shout “see?” about this paragraph. I am watering down to this comment, partly because of that policy itself, and partly because the quoted claim is not clearly well enough justified to conclude the case about whether moderating impulses towards confident wording is useful. I have a sensation I mentally associate with confirmation bias around the topic; my hunch is I’m still right, but I’m pretty sure I don’t have discrete evidence of that, only a gestalt/pile of inconclusive bayesian evidence with sourcing flaws from everyday interaction.