He enjoys what he’s doing, but that’s not the most important measure. If you offered him a hypothetical harmless drug that could bring him even more enjoyment but stop him from working, he would refuse.
That’s a tautology then, “people want what they want”. If I understood Villiam right, he was making a more substantive point: that all aspects of “what we want” ultimately reduce to pleasure, because it’s intrinsically valuable and (presumably) nothing else is. Which is what I’m arguing against.
The original point was against using energy consumption as a measure of worthiness. It’s true that all worthy things tend to consume energy, but energy consumption isn’t proportional to worthiness, and some things that consume energy aren’t worth anything at all. This holds whether one adopts a purely hedonistic view of utility or not.
He enjoys what he’s doing, but that’s not the most important measure. If you offered him a hypothetical harmless drug that could bring him even more enjoyment but stop him from working, he would refuse.
But the refusal of wireheading is itself in service of a terminal value—because “satisfaction” is more than simple pleasure.
That’s a tautology then, “people want what they want”. If I understood Villiam right, he was making a more substantive point: that all aspects of “what we want” ultimately reduce to pleasure, because it’s intrinsically valuable and (presumably) nothing else is. Which is what I’m arguing against.
The original point was against using energy consumption as a measure of worthiness. It’s true that all worthy things tend to consume energy, but energy consumption isn’t proportional to worthiness, and some things that consume energy aren’t worth anything at all. This holds whether one adopts a purely hedonistic view of utility or not.