Russelian monism struggles with Epiphenomenality: if the measurable, structural properties are sufficient to predict what happens, the the phenomenal properties are along for the ride.
I mean, it’s monism—it supposed to only has one type of stuff, obviously structural properties only work, because of underlying phenomenal/physical substrate.
furthermore, since mental states are ultimately identical to physical brain states, they share the causal powers of brain states (again without the need to posit special explanatory apparatus such as “psychophysical laws”), and in that way epiphenomenalism is avoided.
I don’t see how having two special maps has anything to do with monistic ontology, that enables casual closure. What’s the problem with just having neutral-monistic ontology, like you say Dual-aspect neutral monism has, and use normal physical epistemology?
the epistemic irreducibility of the mental to the physical is also accepted.
Why? If ontologically there is only one type of stuff, then you can reduce mental description to physical, because they describe one reality. Same way you reduce old physical theory to a new one.
I mean, it’s monism—it supposed to only has one type of stuff, obviously structural properties only work, because of underlying phenomenal/physical substrate.
I don’t see how having two special maps has anything to do with monistic ontology, that enables casual closure. What’s the problem with just having neutral-monistic ontology, like you say Dual-aspect neutral monism has, and use normal physical epistemology?
Why? If ontologically there is only one type of stuff, then you can reduce mental description to physical, because they describe one reality. Same way you reduce old physical theory to a new one.