That is one of the sequences cited as solving basic problems of epistemology...
In the field of epistemology, the problem of the criterion is an issue regarding the starting point of knowledge. This is a separate and more fundamental issue than the regress argument found in discussions on justification of knowledge.[1]
In Western philosophy the earliest surviving documentation of the problem of the criterion is in the works of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus.[1] In Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus Empiricus demonstrated that no criterion of truth had been established, contrary to the position of dogmatists such as the Stoics and their doctrine of katalepsis.[2] In this Sextus was repeating or building upon earlier Pyrrhonist arguments about the problem of the criterion, as Pyrrho, the founder of Pyrrhonism, had declared that “neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie.[3]”
In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment intended to demonstrate the theoretical impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics, without appealing to accepted assumptions. If it is asked how any given proposition is known to be true, proof in support of that proposition may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of that supporting proof and any subsequent supporting proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three ways of completing a proof:
The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition presupposes the truth of that very proposition
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The dogmatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather than defended”
...I don’t think it does, because merely noting that you have to start somewhere doesn’t mean you are starting in the right place. That’s the standard problem of particularism/dogmatism.
That is one of the sequences cited as solving basic problems of epistemology...
...I don’t think it does, because merely noting that you have to start somewhere doesn’t mean you are starting in the right place. That’s the standard problem of particularism/dogmatism.