This introduces a new thing—whether a person can be good or bad—which is distinct from the argument that I’m trying to make in favor of moral realism. I have a perspective on this question, if it feels vital to you, but I’d rather stick to whether actions can have moral character.
Sure, sorry, didn’t mean to expand the scope there. Let’s rephrase it to “and you’re doing something bad if you don’t”.
(Although if you convince me that actions can be objectively morally bad, it’s pretty trivial to convince me that people who do those actions can be objectively morally bad.)
Sure, sorry, didn’t mean to expand the scope there. Let’s rephrase it to “and you’re doing something bad if you don’t”.
(Although if you convince me that actions can be objectively morally bad, it’s pretty trivial to convince me that people who do those actions can be objectively morally bad.)