I’d argue that there’s a continuum of uncertainty from “already known” to “easily resolved” to “theoretically resolvable using current technology” to “theoretically resolvable with massive resources” to “theoretically resolvable by advanced civilizations”.
There may or may not be an endpoint at “theoretically unknowable”, but it doesn’t matter. The point is that this isn’t a binary distinction, and that categorizing by theory doesn’t help us. The question for any decision theory is “what is the cost and precision that I can get with further modeling or measurements”. Once the cost of information gathering is higher than the remaining risk due to uncertainty, you have to make the choice, and it’s completely irrelevant how much of that remaining uncertainty is embedded in quantum unmeasurables and how much in simple failure to gather facts.
Absolutely—and that continuum is why I think that we should be OK with letting people call things “fundamental uncertainties.” People in these circles spend a lot of time trying to define everything, or argue terminology, but we can get past that in order to note that for making most decisions, it’s OK to treat some (not all) seemingly “random” things as fundamentally unknowable.
This is in contrast to Eliezer’s point that “Uncertainty exists in the map, not in the territory”—not that he’s wrong, just that it’s usually not a useful argument to have. Instead, as you note, we should ask about value of information and make the decision.
This is in contrast to Eliezer’s point that “Uncertainty exists in the map, not in the territory”—not that he’s wrong, just that it’s usually not a useful argument to have.
I don’t know whether he is wrong in the sense that irreducible uncertainty exists in the territory, but the reasoning he uses to reach the conclusion is invalid.
It is not clearly the case that all probability is epistemic uncertainty. There is no valid argument that establishes that. There can be no armchair argument that establishes that, since the existence or otherwise of objective probability is a property of the universe, and has to be established by looking.
I’d argue that there’s a continuum of uncertainty from “already known” to “easily resolved” to “theoretically resolvable using current technology” to “theoretically resolvable with massive resources” to “theoretically resolvable by advanced civilizations”.
There may or may not be an endpoint at “theoretically unknowable”, but it doesn’t matter. The point is that this isn’t a binary distinction, and that categorizing by theory doesn’t help us. The question for any decision theory is “what is the cost and precision that I can get with further modeling or measurements”. Once the cost of information gathering is higher than the remaining risk due to uncertainty, you have to make the choice, and it’s completely irrelevant how much of that remaining uncertainty is embedded in quantum unmeasurables and how much in simple failure to gather facts.
Absolutely—and that continuum is why I think that we should be OK with letting people call things “fundamental uncertainties.” People in these circles spend a lot of time trying to define everything, or argue terminology, but we can get past that in order to note that for making most decisions, it’s OK to treat some (not all) seemingly “random” things as fundamentally unknowable.
This is in contrast to Eliezer’s point that “Uncertainty exists in the map, not in the territory”—not that he’s wrong, just that it’s usually not a useful argument to have. Instead, as you note, we should ask about value of information and make the decision.
I don’t know whether he is wrong in the sense that irreducible uncertainty exists in the territory, but the reasoning he uses to reach the conclusion is invalid.
He’s discussing a different point.
Which is?
That humans fall prey to the mind projection fallacy about much more consequential parts of what is clearly epistemic uncertainty.
It is not clearly the case that all probability is epistemic uncertainty. There is no valid argument that establishes that. There can be no armchair argument that establishes that, since the existence or otherwise of objective probability is a property of the universe, and has to be established by looking.
OK. But, there is still some important epistemic uncertainty that people nonetheless treat as intrinsic, purely because derp.