Can you give me an example that’s guaranteed to be not a misunderstanding?
You can never perceive red and not perceive red simultaneously, but if you could, that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory.
(Tree falls in the forest” type word play doesn’t count)
the initial reaction to the double-slit experiment: there is a logical contradiction, the electron goes through one slit, but it goes through both slits.
That is not a contradiction in the evidence, that is simply a falsification of a prior hypothesis (as well as a violation of human physical intuition). However, If you were to insist upon retaining your old model of the universe after seeing the results of the experiment, then you would have a contradiction within your view of reality (which must accommodate both your previous beliefs and the new evidence)
This is the sort of thing I meant when I said earlier in the thread that the insight I’m referring to here is what led me to realize that there is nothing particularly odd about intuition-violating physics. There’s no reason the axioms of the universe need to be intuitive—they need only be logically consistent.
But, it’s good that you brought up this example: I think Eliezer’s example that Dxu linked, with 2+2=3, is similar to the double slit experiment—it’s violating prior intuitions and hypothesis about the world, not violating logic.
You can never perceive red and not perceive red simultaneously, but if you could, that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory.
I don’t understand. Perception happens in the mind, I don’t see anything unusual about the ability to screw up a mind (via drugs, etc) to the extent that it thinks it perceives red and does not perceive red simultaneously. Why would that imply a “logical contradiction in the territory”?
I’m not talking about it thinks it perceives red even when it doesn’t perceive red—that’s “tree falls in the forest” thinking. I’m talking about simultaneously thinking you perceive red and not thinking your perceive red.
But yes—you could screw up a mind sufficiently such that it thinks it’s perceiving red and not perceiving red simultaneously. Such a mind isn’t following the normal rules (and the rules of logic and so on arise from the rules of the mind in the first place, so of course you could sufficiently destroy or disable a mind such that it no longer things that way—there’s no deeper justification, so you are forced to trust the normal mental process to some degree...that’s what the “no universally compelling arguments and therefore you just have to yourself” spiel I was giving higher in the thread stems from).
I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.
You can never perceive red and not perceive red simultaneously, but if you could, that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory.
(Tree falls in the forest” type word play doesn’t count)
That is not a contradiction in the evidence, that is simply a falsification of a prior hypothesis (as well as a violation of human physical intuition). However, If you were to insist upon retaining your old model of the universe after seeing the results of the experiment, then you would have a contradiction within your view of reality (which must accommodate both your previous beliefs and the new evidence)
This is the sort of thing I meant when I said earlier in the thread that the insight I’m referring to here is what led me to realize that there is nothing particularly odd about intuition-violating physics. There’s no reason the axioms of the universe need to be intuitive—they need only be logically consistent.
But, it’s good that you brought up this example: I think Eliezer’s example that Dxu linked, with 2+2=3, is similar to the double slit experiment—it’s violating prior intuitions and hypothesis about the world, not violating logic.
I don’t understand. Perception happens in the mind, I don’t see anything unusual about the ability to screw up a mind (via drugs, etc) to the extent that it thinks it perceives red and does not perceive red simultaneously. Why would that imply a “logical contradiction in the territory”?
I’m not talking about it thinks it perceives red even when it doesn’t perceive red—that’s “tree falls in the forest” thinking. I’m talking about simultaneously thinking you perceive red and not thinking your perceive red.
But yes—you could screw up a mind sufficiently such that it thinks it’s perceiving red and not perceiving red simultaneously. Such a mind isn’t following the normal rules (and the rules of logic and so on arise from the rules of the mind in the first place, so of course you could sufficiently destroy or disable a mind such that it no longer things that way—there’s no deeper justification, so you are forced to trust the normal mental process to some degree...that’s what the “no universally compelling arguments and therefore you just have to yourself” spiel I was giving higher in the thread stems from).
But you said “that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory” and that doesn’t seem to be so any more.
My original question, if you recall, was for an example of something—anything—that would be falsify your theory.
I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.