I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.
But you said “that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory” and that doesn’t seem to be so any more.
My original question, if you recall, was for an example of something—anything—that would be falsify your theory.
I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.