This comment is a longer and more articulate statement of the comment that I might have written. It gets my endorsement and agreement.
Namely, I don’t think that high levels of confidence in particular view about “level of consciousness” or moral weight of particular animals is justified, and it especially seems incorrect to state that any particular view is obvious.
Further, it seems plausible to me that at reflective equilibrium, I would regard a pain-moment of an individual bee as approximately morally equivalent to a that of a pain-moment individual human.
This comment is a longer and more articulate statement of the comment that I might have written. It gets my endorsement and agreement.
Namely, I don’t think that high levels of confidence in particular view about “level of consciousness” or moral weight of particular animals is justified, and it especially seems incorrect to state that any particular view is obvious.
Further, it seems plausible to me that at reflective equilibrium, I would regard a pain-moment of an individual bee as approximately morally equivalent to a that of a pain-moment individual human.