Let’s consider the Martin Luther King example. He was a criminal, as unjustly determined by the contemporary legal system. But of course, to label him as such, in order to discredit his ideas, would be a central case of the non-central fallacy. There are two sets of “criminals:” people who have been convicted by the legal system under laws still in force, and people convicted of behavior that is both criminal and morally repugnant. MLK fit the first category, but not the second.
So I think the non-central fallacy can be taken two different ways.
Roping in far-distant examples while neglecting to include nearer examples. This is “proving too much.”
I think the example of MLK is an example of (2). If we can’t make a statue of MLK because he was a “criminal,” then we can’t make one of the founding fathers, because they were also criminals—treasonous criminals—in the eyes of the government they were rebelling against at the time.
I think the Martin Luther King scenario is a particularly bad example for explaining the non-central fallacy, because it depends on a conjunction of fallacies, rather than isolating the non-central part. The inference from (1) MLK does/doesn’t fit some category with negative emotional valence, to (2) his ideas are bad just is the ad hominem fallacy (which is distinct from the non-central fallacy). The truth (or falsity) of Bloch’s theorem is logically independent of whether or not André Bloch was a murder (which he was).
But the point of the OP is that fallacies are not logical, but inferential. In social contexts, we often use a leader’s social reputation as a proxy for whether their ideas are any good. The point of the OP is that this may be inferentially reasonable, without being deductively logical.
I agree with your point about there being at least two distinct ways to interpret the non-central fallacy, and also the OPs point that while ad hominem arguments are technically invalid, they can be of high inductive strength in some circumstances. I’m mostly critiquing Scott’s choice of examples for introducing the non-central fallacy, since mixing it with other fallacious forms of reasoning makes it harder to see what the non-central part is contributing to the mistake being made. For this reason, the theft example is preferred by me.
Let’s consider the Martin Luther King example. He was a criminal, as unjustly determined by the contemporary legal system. But of course, to label him as such, in order to discredit his ideas, would be a central case of the non-central fallacy. There are two sets of “criminals:” people who have been convicted by the legal system under laws still in force, and people convicted of behavior that is both criminal and morally repugnant. MLK fit the first category, but not the second.
So I think the non-central fallacy can be taken two different ways.
Skirmishing over the boundaries of a category, as you illustrate here. This is “the categories were made for man, not man for the categories.”
Roping in far-distant examples while neglecting to include nearer examples. This is “proving too much.”
I think the example of MLK is an example of (2). If we can’t make a statue of MLK because he was a “criminal,” then we can’t make one of the founding fathers, because they were also criminals—treasonous criminals—in the eyes of the government they were rebelling against at the time.
I think the Martin Luther King scenario is a particularly bad example for explaining the non-central fallacy, because it depends on a conjunction of fallacies, rather than isolating the non-central part. The inference from (1) MLK does/doesn’t fit some category with negative emotional valence, to (2) his ideas are bad just is the ad hominem fallacy (which is distinct from the non-central fallacy). The truth (or falsity) of Bloch’s theorem is logically independent of whether or not André Bloch was a murder (which he was).
But the point of the OP is that fallacies are not logical, but inferential. In social contexts, we often use a leader’s social reputation as a proxy for whether their ideas are any good. The point of the OP is that this may be inferentially reasonable, without being deductively logical.
I agree with your point about there being at least two distinct ways to interpret the non-central fallacy, and also the OPs point that while ad hominem arguments are technically invalid, they can be of high inductive strength in some circumstances. I’m mostly critiquing Scott’s choice of examples for introducing the non-central fallacy, since mixing it with other fallacious forms of reasoning makes it harder to see what the non-central part is contributing to the mistake being made. For this reason, the theft example is preferred by me.