QM potentially answers cool philosophical questions like, “does cut & paste transportation preserves identity” (it looks like it does, for our universe doesn’t seem to encode any identity at all).
Neurology will most probably tell us nearly everything we will ever know about how humans actually work. I expect many questions formerly considered “philosophical” will be answered by this piece of science.
Therefore, I think nearly all philosophers need to know some QM and neurology.
However, as for your second statement, I would really like an example, because I am not entirely sure what you mean. (I am sincerely requesting examples.)
Unfortunately, I strongly disagree with your third statement. The time it would take to learn QM with sufficient rigor to be interesting could be better spent reading the findings of experimental psychology or learning more mathematics. For the majority of philosophers, their subject matter simply does not overlap with QM in such a way that knowing rigorous QM would help them.
Further, I agree with what paper-machine seemed to imply in their post. A little QM can make a philosopher stupid.
Of course, in certain subjects, knowing QM or neurology should be mandatory.
However, as for your second statement, I would really like an example, because I am not entirely sure what you mean. (I am sincerely requesting examples.)
Few quick examples:
A lot of philosophy of mind assumes there is a singular unified self, whereas neurology might lead you to think of the mind as a group of systems, and this could resolve some dilmnas.
Lots of traditional moral theories assume people make choices in certain ways not backed by observation of their brains.
Your willingness to accept materialist explanations for the mind probably increases exponentially the more you know about the mechanics of the brain. (Are the any dualist neuroscientists?)
A lot of philosophy uses ‘armchair’ reflection and introspection to get foundational intuitions and make judgements. Knowing the hardware you’re running that on is probably helpful. (E.g. showing how easy it is to trigger people’s intuitions one way or the other changed the debate about Gettier cases massively.)
QM potentially answers cool philosophical questions like, “does cut & paste transportation preserves identity” (it looks like it does, for our universe doesn’t seem to encode any identity at all).
Neurology will most probably tell us nearly everything we will ever know about how humans actually work. I expect many questions formerly considered “philosophical” will be answered by this piece of science.
Therefore, I think nearly all philosophers need to know some QM and neurology.
The question is whether knowing a little QM and neurology is more or less harmful than knowing none at all.
Nothing can protect you from people who fail to apply their knowledge well. Partial knowledge at least makes them aware that there is more to learn.
I agree with your first statement.
However, as for your second statement, I would really like an example, because I am not entirely sure what you mean. (I am sincerely requesting examples.)
Unfortunately, I strongly disagree with your third statement. The time it would take to learn QM with sufficient rigor to be interesting could be better spent reading the findings of experimental psychology or learning more mathematics. For the majority of philosophers, their subject matter simply does not overlap with QM in such a way that knowing rigorous QM would help them.
Further, I agree with what paper-machine seemed to imply in their post. A little QM can make a philosopher stupid.
Of course, in certain subjects, knowing QM or neurology should be mandatory.
Few quick examples:
A lot of philosophy of mind assumes there is a singular unified self, whereas neurology might lead you to think of the mind as a group of systems, and this could resolve some dilmnas.
Lots of traditional moral theories assume people make choices in certain ways not backed by observation of their brains.
Your willingness to accept materialist explanations for the mind probably increases exponentially the more you know about the mechanics of the brain. (Are the any dualist neuroscientists?)
A lot of philosophy uses ‘armchair’ reflection and introspection to get foundational intuitions and make judgements. Knowing the hardware you’re running that on is probably helpful. (E.g. showing how easy it is to trigger people’s intuitions one way or the other changed the debate about Gettier cases massively.)
I see and concede. I had been thinking at an excessively low-level.