We have absolutely no reason to believe that behavior correlates with consciousness.
Not to be pedantic, but what else could consciousness possibly be, except for a way of describing the behavior of some object at a high level of abstraction?
If consciousness was not a behavior, but instead was some intrinsic property of a system, then you run into the exact same argument that David Chalmers uses to argue that philosophical zombies are conceivable. This argument was forcefully rebutted in the sequences.
ETA: When I say behavior, I mean it in the physical sense. A human who is paralyzed but nonetheless conscious would not be behaviorally identical to a dead human. Superficially yes, but behavior means more than seeing what goes on outside. While you might say that I’m simply using a different definition of behavior than you were, I think it’s still relevant, because any evolutionary reason for consciousness must necessarily show up in observational behavior, or else there is no benefit and we have a mystery.
Not to be pedantic, but what else could consciousness possibly be, except for a way of describing the behavior of some object at a high level of abstraction?
It could be something that is primarily apparent to the person that has it.
If consciousness was not a behavior, but instead was some intrinsic property of a system, then you run into the exact same argument that David Chalmers uses to argue that philosophical zombies are conceivable.
That runs together two claims: that consciousness is not behaviour, and that it is independent of physics. You don’t have to accept the second claim in order to accept the first.
And it remains the case that Chalmers doesn’t think zombies are really possible.
I think it’s still relevant, because any evolutionary reason for consciousness must necessarily show up in observational behavior, or else there is no benefit and we have a mystery.
“Primarily accessible to the person that has it” does not mean “no behavioural consequences”.
It could be something that is primarily apparent to the person that has it.
I’m not convinced that this definition is sufficiently clear, or that consciousness should be defined this way. Rather, it’s a property of consciousness that people claim that it’s “readily apparent”, but I am not convinced that it has this readily apparent quality to it.
In general, rather than taking the properties of consciousness at face value, I take Dennett’s approach of evaluating people’s claims about consciousness from a behavioral science perspective. From my perspective, once you’ve explained the structure, dynamics, and the behavior, you’ve explained everything.
And it remains the case that Chalmers doesn’t think zombies are really possible.
Are you sure? Chalmers argues in Chapter 3 of The Conscious Mind that zombies are logically possible. I am not really even sure what force the Zombie argument could hold if he thought it was not logically possible.
From my point of view, that’s missing the central point quite badly.
Could you let me know why? What about consciousness is missed by a purely behavioral description of an object (keeping in mind that what I mean by behavior is very broad, and includes things like the behavior of electrical signals)?
Not to be pedantic, but what else could consciousness possibly be, except for a way of describing the behavior of some object at a high level of abstraction?
If consciousness was not a behavior, but instead was some intrinsic property of a system, then you run into the exact same argument that David Chalmers uses to argue that philosophical zombies are conceivable. This argument was forcefully rebutted in the sequences.
ETA: When I say behavior, I mean it in the physical sense. A human who is paralyzed but nonetheless conscious would not be behaviorally identical to a dead human. Superficially yes, but behavior means more than seeing what goes on outside. While you might say that I’m simply using a different definition of behavior than you were, I think it’s still relevant, because any evolutionary reason for consciousness must necessarily show up in observational behavior, or else there is no benefit and we have a mystery.
It could be something that is primarily apparent to the person that has it.
That runs together two claims: that consciousness is not behaviour, and that it is independent of physics. You don’t have to accept the second claim in order to accept the first.
And it remains the case that Chalmers doesn’t think zombies are really possible.
“Primarily accessible to the person that has it” does not mean “no behavioural consequences”.
I’m not convinced that this definition is sufficiently clear, or that consciousness should be defined this way. Rather, it’s a property of consciousness that people claim that it’s “readily apparent”, but I am not convinced that it has this readily apparent quality to it.
In general, rather than taking the properties of consciousness at face value, I take Dennett’s approach of evaluating people’s claims about consciousness from a behavioral science perspective. From my perspective, once you’ve explained the structure, dynamics, and the behavior, you’ve explained everything.
Are you sure? Chalmers argues in Chapter 3 of The Conscious Mind that zombies are logically possible. I am not really even sure what force the Zombie argument could hold if he thought it was not logically possible.
It’s not intended to be a complete definition of consciousness, just a nudge away from behaviourism.
From my point of view, that’s missing the central point quite badly.
And elsewhere that they are metaphysically impossible.
Could you let me know why? What about consciousness is missed by a purely behavioral description of an object (keeping in mind that what I mean by behavior is very broad, and includes things like the behavior of electrical signals)?
What is missed is the way it seems from the inside,as I pointed out originally. I don’t have to put my head into an FMRI to know that I am conscious.