There’s a big difference between recreating an intelligence that exists/existed large numbers of lightyears away due to sheer statistical chance, and creating one that verifiably existed with high probability in your own history. I suspect the latter are enough more interesting to be created first. We might move on to creating the populations of interesting alternate histories, as well as randomly selected worlds and so forth down the line.
Beings who only experience gradients of pleasure might be interesting, but since they already likely have access to immortality wherever they exist (being transhuman / posthuman and all) it seems like there is less utility to trying to resurrect them as it would only be a duplication. Naturally evolved beings lacking the capacity for extreme suffering could be interesting, but it’s hard to say how common they would be throughout the universe—thus it would seem unfair to give them a priority in resurrection compared to naturally evolved ones.
There’s a big difference between recreating an intelligence that exists/existed large numbers of lightyears away due to sheer statistical chance, and creating one that verifiably existed with high probability in your own history.
What difference is that?
Beings who only experience gradients of pleasure might be interesting, but since they already likely have access to immortality wherever they exist (being transhuman / posthuman and all) it seems like there is less utility to trying to resurrect them as it would only be a duplication.
I don’t understand what you mean by “only a duplication”.
Naturally evolved beings lacking the capacity for extreme suffering could be interesting, but it’s hard to say how common they would be throughout the universe—thus it would seem unfair to give them a priority in resurrection compared to naturally evolved ones.
This doesn’t make any sense to me.
Suppose that you were to have a biological child in the traditional way, but could select whether to give them genes predisposing them to extreme depression, hyperthymia, or anything in between. Would you say that you should make your choice based on how common each temperament was in the universe, and not based on the impact to the child’s well-being?
There’s a causal connection in one case that is absent in the other, and a correspondingly higher distribution in the pasts of similar worlds.
I don’t understand what you mean by “only a duplication”.
Duplication of effort as well as effect with respect to other parts of the universe. Meaning you are increasing the numbers of immortals and not granting continued life to those who would otherwise be deprived of it.
Suppose that you were to have a biological child in the traditional way, but could select whether to give them genes predisposing them to extreme depression, hyperthymia, or anything in between. Would you say that you should make your choice based on how common each temperament was in the universe, and not based on the impact to the child’s well-being?
We aren’t talking about the creation of random new lives as a matter of reproduction, we’re talking about the resurrection of people who have lived substantial lives already as part of the universe’s natural existence. If you want to resurrect the most people (out of those who have actually existed and died) in order to grant them some redress against death, you are going to have to recreate people who, for physically plausible reasons, would have actually died.
There’s a big difference between recreating an intelligence that exists/existed large numbers of lightyears away due to sheer statistical chance, and creating one that verifiably existed with high probability in your own history. I suspect the latter are enough more interesting to be created first. We might move on to creating the populations of interesting alternate histories, as well as randomly selected worlds and so forth down the line.
Beings who only experience gradients of pleasure might be interesting, but since they already likely have access to immortality wherever they exist (being transhuman / posthuman and all) it seems like there is less utility to trying to resurrect them as it would only be a duplication. Naturally evolved beings lacking the capacity for extreme suffering could be interesting, but it’s hard to say how common they would be throughout the universe—thus it would seem unfair to give them a priority in resurrection compared to naturally evolved ones.
What difference is that?
I don’t understand what you mean by “only a duplication”.
This doesn’t make any sense to me.
Suppose that you were to have a biological child in the traditional way, but could select whether to give them genes predisposing them to extreme depression, hyperthymia, or anything in between. Would you say that you should make your choice based on how common each temperament was in the universe, and not based on the impact to the child’s well-being?
There’s a causal connection in one case that is absent in the other, and a correspondingly higher distribution in the pasts of similar worlds.
Duplication of effort as well as effect with respect to other parts of the universe. Meaning you are increasing the numbers of immortals and not granting continued life to those who would otherwise be deprived of it.
We aren’t talking about the creation of random new lives as a matter of reproduction, we’re talking about the resurrection of people who have lived substantial lives already as part of the universe’s natural existence. If you want to resurrect the most people (out of those who have actually existed and died) in order to grant them some redress against death, you are going to have to recreate people who, for physically plausible reasons, would have actually died.