You get a pretty similar dynamic just from having a universe that is large enough to contain many almost-identical copies of you.
Again, not sure why a large universe is needed. The expected utility ends up the same either way, whether you have some fraction of branches in which you remain alive or some probability of remaining alive.
Regarding the expected utility calculus. I agree with everything you said but i don’t see how any of it allows you to disregard the counterfactual suffering from not committing suicide in your expected value calculation.
Maybe the crux is whether we consider the utility of each “you” (i.e. you in each branch) individually, and add it up for the total utility, or wether we consider all “you”s to have just one shared utility.
Let’s say that not committing suicide gives you −1 utility in n branches but commiting suicide gives you −100 utility in n/m branches and 0 utility in n−n/m branches
If we treat all copies of you as having separate utilities and add them all up for a total expected utility calculation, not committing suicide gives −n utility while committing suicide leads to −100n/m utility. Therefore, as long as m>100, it is better to commit suicide.
If, on the other hand you treat them as having one shared utility, you get either −1 or −100 utility, and −100 is of course worse.
Do you agree that this is the crux? If so, why do you think that all the copies share one utility rather than their utilities adding up?
In a large universe, you do not end. Like, not in expectation see some branch versus other; you just continue, the computation that is you continues. When you open your eyes, you’re not likely to find yourself as a person in a branch computed only relatively rarely; still, that person continues, and does not die.
Attemted suicide reduces your reality-fluid- how much you’re computed and how likely you are to find yourself there- but you will continue to experience the world. If you die in a nuclear explosion, the continuation of you will be somewhere else, sort-of isekaied; and mostly you will find yourself not in a strange world that recovers the dead but in a world where the nuclear explosion did not appear; still, in a large world, even after a nuclear explosion, you continue.
You might care about having a lot of reality-fluid, because this makes your actions more impactful, because you can spend your lightcone better, and improve the average experience in the large universe. You might also assign negative utility to others seeing you die; they’ll have a lot of reality-fluid in worlds where you’re dead and they can’t talk to you, even as you continue. But I don’t think it works out to assigning the same negative utility to dying as in branches of small worlds.
Yes, but the number of copies of you still reduces (or the probability that you are alive in standard probability theory, or the number of branches in many worlds). Why are these not equivalent in terms of the expected utility calculus?
Imagine they you’re an agent in the game of life. Your world, your laws of physics are computed on a very large independent computers; all performing the same computation.
You exist within the laws of causality of your world, computed as long as at least one server computes your world. If some of them stop performing the computation, it won’t be a death of a copy; you’ll just have one fewer instance of yourself.
You are of course right that there’s no difference between reality-fluid and normal probabilities in a small world: it’s just how much you care about various branches relative to each other, regardless of whether all of them will exist or only some.
I claim that the negative utility due to stopping to exist is just not there, because you don’t actually stop to exist in a way you reflectively care about, when you have fewer instances. For normal things (e.g., how much do you care about paperclips), the expected utility is the same; but here, it’s the kind of terminal value that i expect for most people would be different; guaranteed continuation in 5% of instances is much better than 5% chance of continuing in all instances; in the first case, you don’t die!
I claim that the negative utility due to stopping to exist is just not there
But we are not talking about negative utility due to stopping to exist. We are talking about avoiding counterfactual negative utility by committing suicide, which still exists!
guaranteed continuation in 5% of instances is much better than 5% chance of continuing in all instances; in the first case, you don’t die!
I think this is an artifact of thinking of all of the copies having a shared utility (i.e. you) rather than separate utilities that add up (i.e. so many yous will suffer if you don’t commit suicide). If they have separate utilities, we should think of them as separate instances of yourself.
it’s the kind of terminal value that i expect for most people would be different; guaranteed continuation in 5% of instances is much better than 5% chance of continuing in all instances; in the first case, you don’t die!
And even in the case where we are assigning negative utility to death, most people are really considering counterfactual utility from being alive, and 95% of that (expected) counterfactual utility is lost whether 95% of the “instances of you” die or whether there is a 95% chance that “you” die.
Again, not sure why a large universe is needed. The expected utility ends up the same either way, whether you have some fraction of branches in which you remain alive or some probability of remaining alive.
Regarding the expected utility calculus. I agree with everything you said but i don’t see how any of it allows you to disregard the counterfactual suffering from not committing suicide in your expected value calculation.
Maybe the crux is whether we consider the utility of each “you” (i.e. you in each branch) individually, and add it up for the total utility, or wether we consider all “you”s to have just one shared utility.
Let’s say that not committing suicide gives you −1 utility in n branches but commiting suicide gives you −100 utility in n/m branches and 0 utility in n−n/m branches
If we treat all copies of you as having separate utilities and add them all up for a total expected utility calculation, not committing suicide gives −n utility while committing suicide leads to −100n/m utility. Therefore, as long as m>100, it is better to commit suicide.
If, on the other hand you treat them as having one shared utility, you get either −1 or −100 utility, and −100 is of course worse.
Do you agree that this is the crux? If so, why do you think that all the copies share one utility rather than their utilities adding up?
In a large universe, you do not end. Like, not in expectation see some branch versus other; you just continue, the computation that is you continues. When you open your eyes, you’re not likely to find yourself as a person in a branch computed only relatively rarely; still, that person continues, and does not die.
Attemted suicide reduces your reality-fluid- how much you’re computed and how likely you are to find yourself there- but you will continue to experience the world. If you die in a nuclear explosion, the continuation of you will be somewhere else, sort-of isekaied; and mostly you will find yourself not in a strange world that recovers the dead but in a world where the nuclear explosion did not appear; still, in a large world, even after a nuclear explosion, you continue.
You might care about having a lot of reality-fluid, because this makes your actions more impactful, because you can spend your lightcone better, and improve the average experience in the large universe. You might also assign negative utility to others seeing you die; they’ll have a lot of reality-fluid in worlds where you’re dead and they can’t talk to you, even as you continue. But I don’t think it works out to assigning the same negative utility to dying as in branches of small worlds.
Yes, but the number of copies of you still reduces (or the probability that you are alive in standard probability theory, or the number of branches in many worlds). Why are these not equivalent in terms of the expected utility calculus?
Imagine they you’re an agent in the game of life. Your world, your laws of physics are computed on a very large independent computers; all performing the same computation.
You exist within the laws of causality of your world, computed as long as at least one server computes your world. If some of them stop performing the computation, it won’t be a death of a copy; you’ll just have one fewer instance of yourself.
Whats the difference between fewer instances and fewer copies, and why is that load bearing for the expected utility calculation?
You are of course right that there’s no difference between reality-fluid and normal probabilities in a small world: it’s just how much you care about various branches relative to each other, regardless of whether all of them will exist or only some.
I claim that the negative utility due to stopping to exist is just not there, because you don’t actually stop to exist in a way you reflectively care about, when you have fewer instances. For normal things (e.g., how much do you care about paperclips), the expected utility is the same; but here, it’s the kind of terminal value that i expect for most people would be different; guaranteed continuation in 5% of instances is much better than 5% chance of continuing in all instances; in the first case, you don’t die!
But we are not talking about negative utility due to stopping to exist. We are talking about avoiding counterfactual negative utility by committing suicide, which still exists!
I think this is an artifact of thinking of all of the copies having a shared utility (i.e. you) rather than separate utilities that add up (i.e. so many yous will suffer if you don’t commit suicide). If they have separate utilities, we should think of them as separate instances of yourself.
And even in the case where we are assigning negative utility to death, most people are really considering counterfactual utility from being alive, and 95% of that (expected) counterfactual utility is lost whether 95% of the “instances of you” die or whether there is a 95% chance that “you” die.