I seem to recall seeing some game theoretic signaling models with wasteful pooling equilibria, where everyone sends the same costly signal and the receiver can’t distinguish between the senders of different qualities. Can’t find a specific model now, but here is a slide that mentions this fact on page 20.
One of the original tag-based cooperation papers features a scenario where signal-based cooperation persists—despite regular forgery of the signals used. See:
I seem to recall seeing some game theoretic signaling models with wasteful pooling equilibria, where everyone sends the same costly signal and the receiver can’t distinguish between the senders of different qualities. Can’t find a specific model now, but here is a slide that mentions this fact on page 20.
One of the original tag-based cooperation papers features a scenario where signal-based cooperation persists—despite regular forgery of the signals used. See:
Riolo, R.L., Cohen, M.D., Axelrod, R. (2001) Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity
Sigmund, Karl and Nowak, Martin (2001) Tides of tolerance
Potlach?