There seems to be consensus that Germany’s move to Munich was well founded, and I think I agree. But what of England’s attempt on Brest? It seems to me that A WAL-PIC or A WAL-BEL would have been better moves, especially when you take into account that I had specifically assured England that I would defend Brest. Of course I might have been bluffing, but why take a chance when Belgium and Norway were practically guaranteed gains? Also note that having an army in Belgium is more useful than having a navy there, while having an army in Picardie threatens no less than two French centers and could not have been defended against.
Well, the ultimate defense is, “it worked”. :) But my moves were the result of careful triage. Facing two enemy nations, something had to give, and by abandoning Paris and Marseilles—noting that Germany could only attack one of them—and defending Brest, I could guarantee myself a build. Indeed, if I had decided to use my Gascony army to defend against Germany, I would have guessed he would attack Paris, and I would have been mistaken. Finally, having told England that I would defend Brest, I felt obliged to follow up, to demonstrate that I was not bluffing.
My invading Brest was a way of guaranteeing that you couldn’t get two builds. If you took Portugal with your fleet and defended either Paris or Marseilles, if Germany guessed wrong you’d get two. I actually didn’t assign too high a probability to you giving up the chance at two builds as you ended up doing.
That actually is a pretty standard play. Freaks the heck out of Germany and Austria (he made Austria give up Galicia and Germany give up Holland at no loss in dots, and is still in Tyrolia).
There seems to be consensus that Germany’s move to Munich was well founded, and I think I agree. But what of England’s attempt on Brest? It seems to me that A WAL-PIC or A WAL-BEL would have been better moves, especially when you take into account that I had specifically assured England that I would defend Brest. Of course I might have been bluffing, but why take a chance when Belgium and Norway were practically guaranteed gains? Also note that having an army in Belgium is more useful than having a navy there, while having an army in Picardie threatens no less than two French centers and could not have been defended against.
It seems like a bad idea to try to explain people’s decisions given that nearly everyone in the game has incomplete information.
ETA: Or we can talk about how France protected neither Paris nor Marseilles even though he thought England wouldn’t attack Brest.
Well, the ultimate defense is, “it worked”. :) But my moves were the result of careful triage. Facing two enemy nations, something had to give, and by abandoning Paris and Marseilles—noting that Germany could only attack one of them—and defending Brest, I could guarantee myself a build. Indeed, if I had decided to use my Gascony army to defend against Germany, I would have guessed he would attack Paris, and I would have been mistaken. Finally, having told England that I would defend Brest, I felt obliged to follow up, to demonstrate that I was not bluffing.
My invading Brest was a way of guaranteeing that you couldn’t get two builds. If you took Portugal with your fleet and defended either Paris or Marseilles, if Germany guessed wrong you’d get two. I actually didn’t assign too high a probability to you giving up the chance at two builds as you ended up doing.
Yes, those sort of recriminations are delightful.
Anybody got any on me?
Why convoy to Albania?
I do believe that one was covered by the newspapers :P
It still seems reckless, especially considering Austria and Turkey appear to be allied.
You invaded Tyrolia only to turn around?
That actually is a pretty standard play. Freaks the heck out of Germany and Austria (he made Austria give up Galicia and Germany give up Holland at no loss in dots, and is still in Tyrolia).