This is somewhat tangential, but I am bothered by that Pinker quote:
Another social psychologist, Eliot Aronson, nailed it down: people doctor their beliefs only to eliminate contradiction with the proposition “I am nice and in control.”
It seems too precise to me. It does not seem to fit very well Festinger’s original example or the example of this post. Chris’s example emphasized other people’s opinions. Festinger likewise emphasized the differential response of the cultists who were together on doomsday with those who were apart; and he emphasized not just confabulation, but the shift to evangelism. I am sure Aronson made an important contribution to identify the strongest sources of dissonance. Probably he jumped from there to dismissal of all other sources. Maybe he really has a full theory of dissonance, but I don’t believe it’s this one line.
With the cultists, admitting they were totally wrong would show they weren’t in control (or effective). Finding some way to rationalize their failed prediction and show that they were really right all along preserves their outward picture of themselves as in control and effective.
The link between Aronson line and other people’s opinions is just that we’re trying to sell other people on the belief that “I am nice and in control.”
Hmmm… maybe should edit the post to make that second part clearer.
Maybe we care not just about believing that we’re “nice and in control,” but about others believing it, but that isn’t Aronson’s theory (as summarized by Pinker). Also, that wasn’t Festinger’s interpretation of the need for publicity, which was a change from before doomsday.
Um, have you read Pinker? I may have cut out too much in my quote. Pinker is pretty clear that our reason for being biased towards thinking we’re “nice and in control” is (from an evolutionary perspective, at least) so that we can better convince others of that.
But fair point about Festinger and the need for publicity.
This is somewhat tangential, but I am bothered by that Pinker quote:
It seems too precise to me. It does not seem to fit very well Festinger’s original example or the example of this post. Chris’s example emphasized other people’s opinions. Festinger likewise emphasized the differential response of the cultists who were together on doomsday with those who were apart; and he emphasized not just confabulation, but the shift to evangelism. I am sure Aronson made an important contribution to identify the strongest sources of dissonance. Probably he jumped from there to dismissal of all other sources. Maybe he really has a full theory of dissonance, but I don’t believe it’s this one line.
With the cultists, admitting they were totally wrong would show they weren’t in control (or effective). Finding some way to rationalize their failed prediction and show that they were really right all along preserves their outward picture of themselves as in control and effective.
The link between Aronson line and other people’s opinions is just that we’re trying to sell other people on the belief that “I am nice and in control.”
Hmmm… maybe should edit the post to make that second part clearer.
Maybe we care not just about believing that we’re “nice and in control,” but about others believing it, but that isn’t Aronson’s theory (as summarized by Pinker). Also, that wasn’t Festinger’s interpretation of the need for publicity, which was a change from before doomsday.
Um, have you read Pinker? I may have cut out too much in my quote. Pinker is pretty clear that our reason for being biased towards thinking we’re “nice and in control” is (from an evolutionary perspective, at least) so that we can better convince others of that.
But fair point about Festinger and the need for publicity.