Would it be fair to say that moral indefinability is basically what Yudkowsky was talking about with his slogan “Value is complex?”
What about the stance of Particularism in moral philosophy? On the face of it it seems very different, but I think it may be getting at a similar phenomenon.
I address (something similar to) Yudkowsky’s view in the paragraph starting:
I would guess that many anti-realists are sympathetic to the arguments I’ve made above, but still believe that we can make morality precise without changing our meta-level intuitions much—for example, by grounding our ethical beliefs in what idealised versions of ourselves would agree with, after long reflection.
Particularism feels relevant and fairly similar to what I’m saying, although maybe with a bit of a different emphasis.
Would it be fair to say that moral indefinability is basically what Yudkowsky was talking about with his slogan “Value is complex?”
What about the stance of Particularism in moral philosophy? On the face of it it seems very different, but I think it may be getting at a similar phenomenon.
I address (something similar to) Yudkowsky’s view in the paragraph starting:
Particularism feels relevant and fairly similar to what I’m saying, although maybe with a bit of a different emphasis.