Could you clarify if you mean claim 3 (“There are higher-impact uses of your (time/energy/money/etc.)”) is:
never true
technically true occasionally but so rare it’s not worth considering
true n% percent of the time
I expected the subbullet to be a refutation of the claim, but right now I think even if you agree with all the clauses it demonstrates only that the claim can be made in error (which I agree with). It doesn’t make the case that it’s impossible for the claim to hold for a given individual, or even that it’s necessarily rare for it to do so.
[edit: reading this back, it’s less clear and more tangential than I’d intended. To be more direct: I think claim 3 is sometimes true, but usually either partially or entirely beside the point. ‘There are higher-impact uses of resource X available to you than action Y’ is only a strong argument against taking action Y if a) the alternative you will actually choose is higher impact than Y, and b) you have insufficient X to do the higher-impact things and Y. I think both a and b are often false in this context, and at least one of them is usually false.
original reply is below.]
I think it’s sometimes true, but the implied zero-sum framing of the relevant resources is often false, misleading, or irrelevant, because:
almost all of us have plenty of room to increase our ‘moral budget’ by shifting some resources away from self-interest and toward doing good by others. Pointing out that X isn’t the best possible use of my resources is unhelpful if the alternative I’m actually going to take is even further from optimal.
not only are ~none of us optimally altruistic, many of us aren’t doing a particularly good job of optimising for some combination of self-interest and altruism, or even for pure self-interest. So there aren’t only tradeoffs; efficiency gains are also possible.
I don’t think our mental resource pool is fixed. Opportunity costs are real, but some investments create net gains. Likewise, sometimes doing a hard thing that we believe is right can increase our capacity to do other good things, without requiring a counterbalancing sacrifice of personal well-being or productivity.
I also think the veganism question is exactly the sort of dilemma that makes self-delusion and rationalisation extremely tempting. If I can convince myself that e.g. my work is so important that I morally ought to do (almost) whatever is necessary to optimise my personal productivity, then I can escape from having to experience any internal conflict or guilt over taking ‘selfish’ actions.
almost all of us have plenty of room to increase our ‘moral budget’ by shifting some resources away from self-interest and toward doing good by others.
Except people who are obsessed with having the most impact they can, which describes a lot of people in effective altruism.
I don’t understand the relevance of your second bullet point.
I agree with the third bullet point, but this only works in particular situations where you get synergies. (E.g., a lot of people who go vegan also use the opportunity to become healthier, and that can work well. However, if you’re already a health nut before veganism, you’d find that veganism limits your options and it would get harder to follow the best health advice.)
If I can convince myself that e.g. my work is so important that I morally ought to do (almost) whatever is necessary to optimise my personal productivity, then I can escape from having to experience any internal conflict or guilt over taking ‘selfish’ actions.
This sort of argument can be levelled against anything related to doing slightly weird things due to opportunity costs. It isn’t always right.
I also feel like the argument goes both ways. If you can convince yourself that you’re really moral every time you eat food without animal products, maybe you become more complacent in other ways or rationalize that people who optimize for doing good via workaholicism and cutting down on all non-essential areas of life must all be deluding themselves.
Could you clarify if you mean claim 3 (“There are higher-impact uses of your (time/energy/money/etc.)”) is:
never true
technically true occasionally but so rare it’s not worth considering
true n% percent of the time
I expected the subbullet to be a refutation of the claim, but right now I think even if you agree with all the clauses it demonstrates only that the claim can be made in error (which I agree with). It doesn’t make the case that it’s impossible for the claim to hold for a given individual, or even that it’s necessarily rare for it to do so.
[edit: reading this back, it’s less clear and more tangential than I’d intended. To be more direct: I think claim 3 is sometimes true, but usually either partially or entirely beside the point. ‘There are higher-impact uses of resource X available to you than action Y’ is only a strong argument against taking action Y if a) the alternative you will actually choose is higher impact than Y, and b) you have insufficient X to do the higher-impact things and Y. I think both a and b are often false in this context, and at least one of them is usually false.
original reply is below.]
I think it’s sometimes true, but the implied zero-sum framing of the relevant resources is often false, misleading, or irrelevant, because:
almost all of us have plenty of room to increase our ‘moral budget’ by shifting some resources away from self-interest and toward doing good by others. Pointing out that X isn’t the best possible use of my resources is unhelpful if the alternative I’m actually going to take is even further from optimal.
not only are ~none of us optimally altruistic, many of us aren’t doing a particularly good job of optimising for some combination of self-interest and altruism, or even for pure self-interest. So there aren’t only tradeoffs; efficiency gains are also possible.
I don’t think our mental resource pool is fixed. Opportunity costs are real, but some investments create net gains. Likewise, sometimes doing a hard thing that we believe is right can increase our capacity to do other good things, without requiring a counterbalancing sacrifice of personal well-being or productivity.
I also think the veganism question is exactly the sort of dilemma that makes self-delusion and rationalisation extremely tempting. If I can convince myself that e.g. my work is so important that I morally ought to do (almost) whatever is necessary to optimise my personal productivity, then I can escape from having to experience any internal conflict or guilt over taking ‘selfish’ actions.
Except people who are obsessed with having the most impact they can, which describes a lot of people in effective altruism.
I don’t understand the relevance of your second bullet point.
I agree with the third bullet point, but this only works in particular situations where you get synergies. (E.g., a lot of people who go vegan also use the opportunity to become healthier, and that can work well. However, if you’re already a health nut before veganism, you’d find that veganism limits your options and it would get harder to follow the best health advice.)
This sort of argument can be levelled against anything related to doing slightly weird things due to opportunity costs. It isn’t always right.
I also feel like the argument goes both ways. If you can convince yourself that you’re really moral every time you eat food without animal products, maybe you become more complacent in other ways or rationalize that people who optimize for doing good via workaholicism and cutting down on all non-essential areas of life must all be deluding themselves.