Not that I’m a fan of this definition/view (also, who advocates this?), but it seems to me that much of this is locally invalid?
- that it can be felt in one unique way defined exactly by that causal structure and nothing else,
What else would determine how a structure is felt? If it’s something outside of that structure, why not incorporate it into the causal structure? If it’s not something causal, how would it influence how it’s feeling.
- that any such structure can be felt,
Why is this problematic?
- that it can not be felt outside,
I don’t see how defining consciousness as “how causal structures feels from inside” assumes/implies that.
- that casual structures separate from light cone exit at all— that the “inside” of causal structure is timeless.
Why do you think this definition assumes this?
Finally, it is tautological because consciousness is by definition is something which I feel inside.
It points to the causal structure as the relevant determiner of the conscious experience, which is not necessarily assumed by the pre-definitional concept of consciousness.
Also, tautological definitions are fine. Like, refactoring a concept to an equivalent formulation can be productive, because it may allow you to look at the same old thing from a different angle, possibly also leading to a refactoring into a non-equivalent, more mature nature-at-joint-carving reformulation of the original concept.
- that it can be felt in one unique way defined exactly by that causal structure and nothing else,
casual structure can’t define qualia: casual structure is cloreless and qualia have qualitative differences. This assumes existence of some table of correspondence between casual structures and qualia. Such table is outside the qualia structure but affect experience.Also, casual structure is abstraction as whole particles in the past light cone affects me.
- that any such structure can be felt
Here the problems is with panpsychism and enormous amount of Boltzmann brains it creates in any stone.
- that it can not be felt outside,
If we define something as how it felt from inside, it means that something can be felt outside. But everuthing we feel is what we feel so it is felt from inside. Another point here is that i can’t feel other person or object’s closed casual structure. But here is the problem: if I read a book, my causal structure expand beyong my brain and to the authors brain. Why I don’t feel his feeling if we are just one casual structure?
- that casual structures separate from light cone exit at all— that the “inside” of causal structure is timeless.
The problem here is that if we wanted to say that consciousness is how lightcone feels itself—we would say this—but it is much stronger claim and typically we assume some closed casual structures inside the brain like chains of firing of neurons. Any observer-moment has all qualia presented simultaneously, so it is timeless, However, causal processes are serial in time. So either I can feel past moments (absurd) or the experience is distributed timelessly inside some empty space in the causal process (also absurd).
Not that I’m a fan of this definition/view (also, who advocates this?), but it seems to me that much of this is locally invalid?
What else would determine how a structure is felt? If it’s something outside of that structure, why not incorporate it into the causal structure? If it’s not something causal, how would it influence how it’s feeling.
Why is this problematic?
I don’t see how defining consciousness as “how causal structures feels from inside” assumes/implies that.
Why do you think this definition assumes this?
It points to the causal structure as the relevant determiner of the conscious experience, which is not necessarily assumed by the pre-definitional concept of consciousness.
Also, tautological definitions are fine. Like, refactoring a concept to an equivalent formulation can be productive, because it may allow you to look at the same old thing from a different angle, possibly also leading to a refactoring into a non-equivalent, more mature nature-at-joint-carving reformulation of the original concept.
- that it can be felt in one unique way defined exactly by that causal structure and nothing else,
casual structure can’t define qualia: casual structure is cloreless and qualia have qualitative differences. This assumes existence of some table of correspondence between casual structures and qualia. Such table is outside the qualia structure but affect experience.Also, casual structure is abstraction as whole particles in the past light cone affects me.
- that any such structure can be felt
Here the problems is with panpsychism and enormous amount of Boltzmann brains it creates in any stone.
- that it can not be felt outside,
If we define something as how it felt from inside, it means that something can be felt outside. But everuthing we feel is what we feel so it is felt from inside. Another point here is that i can’t feel other person or object’s closed casual structure. But here is the problem: if I read a book, my causal structure expand beyong my brain and to the authors brain. Why I don’t feel his feeling if we are just one casual structure?
- that casual structures separate from light cone exit at all—
that the “inside” of causal structure is timeless.
The problem here is that if we wanted to say that consciousness is how lightcone feels itself—we would say this—but it is much stronger claim and typically we assume some closed casual structures inside the brain like chains of firing of neurons.
Any observer-moment has all qualia presented simultaneously, so it is timeless, However, causal processes are serial in time. So either I can feel past moments (absurd) or the experience is distributed timelessly inside some empty space in the causal process (also absurd).