What about calling black people the n-word, making Holocaust jokes to Jews, and insulting people’s dead relatives?
The distinction here is that if an outsider does these things it is clearly hostile.
Black people are reclaiming the word “nigger”. Part of the stated reason is to take away the word’s ability to harm, in other words, exactly the reason I mentioned. I am not black, so in context, it would seem hostile, just as bombarding the only Muslim family in a neighborhood with Mohammed cartoons would be hostile.
The example you gave above treats the images as harmful without context. (For a Muslim, seeing an image of Mohammed “hurts” [I don’t accept this, btw, offense and harm are not the same thing.] regardless of the intention of the image creator.) So the comparable example would be using “nigger” by another black person or in an academic context, or a Holocaust survivor making jokes about the Holocaust, or a family member joking about the foibles of a dead relative. And yes, I have no problem with any of these things.
It doesn’t really seem like you put thought into these examples. Rather, it seems like you made a list of doubleplusungood things and tried to tar me with the association.
My point was that what hurts people about Yvain’s examples is that someone is obviously behaving in a hostile way toward them, not the offensive thing in itself. Images of Mohammed are haraam in Islam regardless of intent.
Ah, I see. Then a white person saying ‘nigger’ is indeed not comparable to participating in Everybody Draw Muhammad Day, but a black person saying ‘nigger’ is still not comparable either. No person saying ‘nigger’ could actually be comparable, since that word is not haraam.
Now that I’ve written this, I realise that some black people hold the opinion that this word is haraam; they argue that even black people should not use it. Then EDM Day is a bit more like a white person saying ‘nigger’ (as a protest against banning it, of course, not with the intention of causing offence).
By the way, I’d appreciate it if whoever downvoted the grandparent would explain what was wrong with it. Too brief? (But I think that knb understood it fine.) I would hate to think that people get downvoted for admitting that they don’t understand somebody.
I recall reading somewhere that there are different sources of moral rules, I think things being sacred was one of them, ‘purity’ might have been another one or the same one, and if anyone remembers the three things I would appreciate knowing.
So by rejecting sacred cows, does this mean you would eliminate the whole category of moral rules that depend on something bring sacred? (I don’t think this is necessarily so from what you’ve said.)
I ask myself if I attach moral weight to anything sacred and I’m not sure.
Actually, I think so—I can think of some things that I care about symbolically, rather than just at the object level—but I attach the morality to my relationship with this thing rather than other people’s, so I’m not easily as offended. (though I can now think of some cases where I am)
So I’m confused on the topic. What do you think of ‘sacred’ in general?
I recall reading somewhere that there are different sources of moral rules, I think things being sacred was one of them, ‘purity’ might have been another one or the same one, and if anyone remembers the three things I would appreciate knowing.
You probably have in mind the theories of Jonathan Haidt.
I am skeptical towards his theories, though. There may be some truth in them, but his approach is extremely ideologized and, in my opinion, biased accordingly. (On the other hand, I do appreciate that he is explicit and upfront about his ideology and its role in his work. It is certainly a welcome contrast to what is commonly seen in academia.)
The 3 are community, autonomy, and divinity, and they come from the work of cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder. Purity was a big part of the ethic of divinity, so much so that you could even argue that “purity” would be a more appropriate label for it.
Jonathan Haidt worked with Shweder at the start of his career and basically adopted Shweder’s system, but he has since modified his views to include 5 moral foundations rather than 3: harm, fairness, ingroup, hierarchy, and purity.
But I never read Shweder or Haidt, I was only exposed to those ideas on LW.
Aha! Now that I know what to google, I discover that I was exposed to these ideas here.
I even took that quiz to find that I was relatively low on the purity foundation, just as in the example figure. The model and the quiz made a favorable impression—I decided I was comfortable with carving morality in that way—but then I apparently forgot the details.
The distinction here is that if an outsider does these things it is clearly hostile.
Black people are reclaiming the word “nigger”. Part of the stated reason is to take away the word’s ability to harm, in other words, exactly the reason I mentioned. I am not black, so in context, it would seem hostile, just as bombarding the only Muslim family in a neighborhood with Mohammed cartoons would be hostile.
The example you gave above treats the images as harmful without context. (For a Muslim, seeing an image of Mohammed “hurts” [I don’t accept this, btw, offense and harm are not the same thing.] regardless of the intention of the image creator.) So the comparable example would be using “nigger” by another black person or in an academic context, or a Holocaust survivor making jokes about the Holocaust, or a family member joking about the foibles of a dead relative. And yes, I have no problem with any of these things.
It doesn’t really seem like you put thought into these examples. Rather, it seems like you made a list of doubleplusungood things and tried to tar me with the association.
I don’t understand your comment. We’re not talking about Muslims drawing pictures of Muhammad.
My point was that what hurts people about Yvain’s examples is that someone is obviously behaving in a hostile way toward them, not the offensive thing in itself. Images of Mohammed are haraam in Islam regardless of intent.
Ah, I see. Then a white person saying ‘nigger’ is indeed not comparable to participating in Everybody Draw Muhammad Day, but a black person saying ‘nigger’ is still not comparable either. No person saying ‘nigger’ could actually be comparable, since that word is not haraam.
Now that I’ve written this, I realise that some black people hold the opinion that this word is haraam; they argue that even black people should not use it. Then EDM Day is a bit more like a white person saying ‘nigger’ (as a protest against banning it, of course, not with the intention of causing offence).
By the way, I’d appreciate it if whoever downvoted the grandparent would explain what was wrong with it. Too brief? (But I think that knb understood it fine.) I would hate to think that people get downvoted for admitting that they don’t understand somebody.
I recall reading somewhere that there are different sources of moral rules, I think things being sacred was one of them, ‘purity’ might have been another one or the same one, and if anyone remembers the three things I would appreciate knowing.
So by rejecting sacred cows, does this mean you would eliminate the whole category of moral rules that depend on something bring sacred? (I don’t think this is necessarily so from what you’ve said.)
I ask myself if I attach moral weight to anything sacred and I’m not sure.
Actually, I think so—I can think of some things that I care about symbolically, rather than just at the object level—but I attach the morality to my relationship with this thing rather than other people’s, so I’m not easily as offended. (though I can now think of some cases where I am)
So I’m confused on the topic. What do you think of ‘sacred’ in general?
You probably have in mind the theories of Jonathan Haidt.
I am skeptical towards his theories, though. There may be some truth in them, but his approach is extremely ideologized and, in my opinion, biased accordingly. (On the other hand, I do appreciate that he is explicit and upfront about his ideology and its role in his work. It is certainly a welcome contrast to what is commonly seen in academia.)
The 3 are community, autonomy, and divinity, and they come from the work of cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder. Purity was a big part of the ethic of divinity, so much so that you could even argue that “purity” would be a more appropriate label for it.
Jonathan Haidt worked with Shweder at the start of his career and basically adopted Shweder’s system, but he has since modified his views to include 5 moral foundations rather than 3: harm, fairness, ingroup, hierarchy, and purity.
Those are the three, thanks.
But I never read Shweder or Haidt, I was only exposed to those ideas on LW.
Aha! Now that I know what to google, I discover that I was exposed to these ideas here.
I even took that quiz to find that I was relatively low on the purity foundation, just as in the example figure. The model and the quiz made a favorable impression—I decided I was comfortable with carving morality in that way—but then I apparently forgot the details.