(5.31) Desire utilitarianism replaces preferences with desire. The differences are pretty technical and I don’t understand all of them, but desire utilitarians sure seem to think their system is better.
Then I would suggest either doing the research or not mentioning it, since this is not critical to the concept of consequentialism. I’m not entirely clear on it either.
Desire utilitarianism doesn’t replace preferences with desires, it replaces actions with desires. It’s not a consequentialist system; it’s actually a type of virtue ethics. When confronted with the “fat man” trolley problem, it concludes that there are good agents that would push the fat man and other good agents that wouldn’t. You should probably avoid mentioning it.
Desire utilitarianism doesn’t replace preferences with desires, it replaces actions with desires. It’s not a consequentialist system; it’s actually a type of virtue ethics. When confronted with the “fat man” trolley problem, it concludes that there are good agents that would push the fat man and other good agents that wouldn’t. You should probably avoid mentioning it.
Thank you. That makes more sense than the last explanation of it I read.