I would tend to say that ‘normal’ people also make their way through life by predicting how normal people would act, trained by having observed a lot of them.
The difference is between “I feel this would be a good response in this situation” and “I have observed this response in this kind of situation to have good consequences.”
I don’t think I understand what you mean. To the extent that I might understand it I tentatively think I don’t agree, but would you find it useful to describe the distinction in more detail, perhaps with examples?
The difference would be between intuitively feeling what I should do, and reasoning about (or mimicking) what a person with a different neurology (in this case, a neurotypical person) would do.
So you mean different modes of subjective experience? That’s quite relevant in terms of how to manage such things from the inside, yes. But what I meant by “predict” above was as applied to the entire system—and I model “intuitive feeling of normal” as largely prediction-based as well, which is part of what I was getting at. People who are raised with different environmental examples of “what normal people do” wind up with different such intuitions. I’m not quite sure where this is going, admittedly.
I’m disputing that the intuitive feeling of what to do in a social interaction, that neurotypical people have, is based on predictions gained from experience, rather than on the innate capacity of the neurotypical brain to hardware-accelerate social interactions.
The content of that feeling would be based on predictions gained from experience, but the kind of that feeling wouldn’t.
The brain of an autistic person might give them the same information, but it wouldn’t be the content of the same quale (kind of like getting the same information through hearing in the case of one person and through seeing in the case of another person).
The difference is between “I feel this would be a good response in this situation” and “I have observed this response in this kind of situation to have good consequences.”
I don’t think I understand what you mean. To the extent that I might understand it I tentatively think I don’t agree, but would you find it useful to describe the distinction in more detail, perhaps with examples?
The difference would be between intuitively feeling what I should do, and reasoning about (or mimicking) what a person with a different neurology (in this case, a neurotypical person) would do.
So you mean different modes of subjective experience? That’s quite relevant in terms of how to manage such things from the inside, yes. But what I meant by “predict” above was as applied to the entire system—and I model “intuitive feeling of normal” as largely prediction-based as well, which is part of what I was getting at. People who are raised with different environmental examples of “what normal people do” wind up with different such intuitions. I’m not quite sure where this is going, admittedly.
I’m disputing that the intuitive feeling of what to do in a social interaction, that neurotypical people have, is based on predictions gained from experience, rather than on the innate capacity of the neurotypical brain to hardware-accelerate social interactions.
The content of that feeling would be based on predictions gained from experience, but the kind of that feeling wouldn’t.
The brain of an autistic person might give them the same information, but it wouldn’t be the content of the same quale (kind of like getting the same information through hearing in the case of one person and through seeing in the case of another person).