By “acausal democracy”, I mean the attempt to justify the practice of democracy—specifically, the act of voting—with timeless decision theory. No-one until you has attempted to depict a genuinely acausal democracy :-) This doesn’t involve the “fallacy of selective attention”, it’s another sort of error, or combination of errors, in which TDT reasoning is supposed to apply to agents with only a bare similarity to yourself. See discussion here for a related example.
I also think we agree regarding acausal blackmail, that for a human being it can only be a mistake. Only one of those “eccentric agents” with a very peculiar utility function or decision architecture could rationally be susceptible to acausal blackmail—its decision procedure would have to insist that “selective attention” (to just those possible worlds where the specific blackmail threat is being made) is important, rather than attending to other worlds where contrary threats are being made, or to worlds where the action under consideration will be rewarded rather than punished, or to worlds where the agent is simply a free agent not being threatened or enticed by a captor who cares about acausal dealmaking (and those worlds should be in the vast majority).
By “acausal democracy”, I mean the attempt to justify the practice of democracy—specifically, the act of voting—with timeless decision theory. No-one until you has attempted to depict a genuinely acausal democracy :-) This doesn’t involve the “fallacy of selective attention”, it’s another sort of error, or combination of errors, in which TDT reasoning is supposed to apply to agents with only a bare similarity to yourself. See discussion here for a related example.
I also think we agree regarding acausal blackmail, that for a human being it can only be a mistake. Only one of those “eccentric agents” with a very peculiar utility function or decision architecture could rationally be susceptible to acausal blackmail—its decision procedure would have to insist that “selective attention” (to just those possible worlds where the specific blackmail threat is being made) is important, rather than attending to other worlds where contrary threats are being made, or to worlds where the action under consideration will be rewarded rather than punished, or to worlds where the agent is simply a free agent not being threatened or enticed by a captor who cares about acausal dealmaking (and those worlds should be in the vast majority).
Right, humans can’t even do straightforward causal reasoning, let alone weird superrational reasoning.