I think there’s two things going on in different people.
The “I’m altruistic, and altruistic people should have more power” thing feels very much like the kind of generic self-justification thing (“I’m $INGROUP so therefore I’m good, and good people should have more power”) that will make anyone feel their power-grab is justified. Many secular Westerners have been taught that “I’m of the True Religion” or “I’m of the Best Nationality” aren’t acceptable justifications for claiming your own superiority over others, but “I’m altruistic” sounds non-ingroupy so it bypasses that immune response.
Knowing about consequentialism can help further rationalize that, but without the self-serving instinct one wouldn’t be motivated to generate the “this is why I should have more power” story and accompanying rationalization in the first place.
But then, if someone is mostly altruistic and someone else has already generated an elaborate “this is why we should grab power” rationalization, the altruistic person may not be able to notice the flaws in the logic, and their consequentialism will then drive them to adopt that reasoning.
So you get two kinds of people: ones whose moral instincts would have been overpowered by their self-serving ones anyway, and ones whose moral instincts would have held firm if not for the story that the former group sold them on.
I think there’s two things going on in different people.
The “I’m altruistic, and altruistic people should have more power” thing feels very much like the kind of generic self-justification thing (“I’m $INGROUP so therefore I’m good, and good people should have more power”) that will make anyone feel their power-grab is justified. Many secular Westerners have been taught that “I’m of the True Religion” or “I’m of the Best Nationality” aren’t acceptable justifications for claiming your own superiority over others, but “I’m altruistic” sounds non-ingroupy so it bypasses that immune response.
Knowing about consequentialism can help further rationalize that, but without the self-serving instinct one wouldn’t be motivated to generate the “this is why I should have more power” story and accompanying rationalization in the first place.
But then, if someone is mostly altruistic and someone else has already generated an elaborate “this is why we should grab power” rationalization, the altruistic person may not be able to notice the flaws in the logic, and their consequentialism will then drive them to adopt that reasoning.
So you get two kinds of people: ones whose moral instincts would have been overpowered by their self-serving ones anyway, and ones whose moral instincts would have held firm if not for the story that the former group sold them on.