And yet here you demand I immediately change my mind in response to reason and evidence.
I think this is an improperly narrow interpretation of the word now in the grandparent’s “I’ll take that retraction and apology now.” A retraction and apology in a few days after you’ve taken some time to cool down and reflect would be entirely in line with Schopenhauer’s advice. I await the possibility with cautious optimism.
Zack Davis describes that position as “laughable, obviously wrong, and deeply corrosive”
You had just disparagingly characterized Achmiz as “describing [interlocutors’] positions as laughable, obviously wrong, deeply corrosive, etc”. I was deliberately “biting the bullet” by choosing to express my literal disagreement with your hyperbolic insult using those same words verbatim, in order to stick up for the right to express disagreement using strong language when appropriate.
Just checking that you “got the joke.”
“normatively correct”. You guys
Please note that I had put a Disagree react on the phrase “normatively correct” on the comment in question. (The react was subsequently upvoted by Drake Morrison and Habryka.)
My actual position is subtler: I think Schopenhauer is correct to point out that it’s possible to concede an argument too early and that good outcomes often result from being obstinate in the heat of an argument and then reflecting at leisure later, but I think describing the obstinacy behavior as “normatively correct” is taking it way too far; that’s not what the word normative means.
I looked over the comment, while I think it was a reasonable stab at what I was trying to say, it didn’t quite meet my standards for expressing my opinion versus stating a verifiable fact, so I’ve edited it.
I’m happy that my comment is more accurate and I’m grateful to Said’s comment for that effect; I do think his comment about not-changing-your-mind-in-response-to-reason-or-argument being ‘normatively correct’ was misleading about his epistemic state (e.g. this also communicated the wrong thing to Zack).
And yet here you demand I immediately change my mind in response to reason and evidence.
I think this is an improperly narrow interpretation of the word now in the grandparent’s “I’ll take that retraction and apology now.” A retraction and apology in a few days after you’ve taken some time to cool down and reflect would be entirely in line with Schopenhauer’s advice. I await the possibility with cautious optimism.
Who could possibly be disagree-voting with this comment? What does it even mean to disagree with me saying that I endorse someone’s interpretation of my own words?
My actual position is subtler: I think Schopenhauer is correct to point out that it’s possible to concede an argument too early and that good outcomes often result from being obstinate in the heat of an argument and then reflecting at leisure later, but I think describing the obstinacy behavior as “normatively correct” is taking it way too far
I think that this position is reasonable, but wrong. On the other hand, perhaps we do not actually disagree on this point, as such, because of the next point:
that’s not what the word normative means
I disagree. Elaborating:
Suppose that we are considering some class of situations, and two possible behaviors, A and B, in such a situation; and we are discussing which is the correct behavior in a situation of the given class. It may be the case (and we may claim) that any of the following hold:
Behavior A is always correct; behavior B is never correct.
Behavior B is always correct; behavior A is never correct.
In all cases, either A or B is fine; both are acceptable, neither is wrong.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong; in yet other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In certain situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong; in other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In which of these scenarios would you assent to the claim that “A is normatively correct”?
My own position is that the answer is “all of the above except #2 and possibly #7”. (I can see a definitional argument based on #7, but I am not strongly committed to including it in the definition of “normative”.)
When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
(Example usage, bolding added: “Normatively, theories are preferred to the quantitative extent that they are simple and predict the observed data [...] For contingent evolutionary-psychological reasons, humans are innately biased to prefer ‘their own’ ideas, and in that context, a ‘principle of charity’ can be useful as a corrective heuristic—but the corrective heuristic only works by colliding the non-normative bias with a fairness instinct [...]”)
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
Understood. However, I am not sure that I approve of this usage; and it is certainly not how I use the word (or, to a first approximation, any words) myself. My comments are, unless specified otherwise, generally intended to refer to actually-existing humans.[1]
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
Indeed, so either we take this to mean that any normative claims about how to conduct such debates are necessarily meaningless, or else we allow for a concept of normativity that is not restricted to idealized Bayesian reasoners (which, I must remind you, are not actually real things that exist). Now, I am not saying that we should not identify an ideal and try to approach it asymptotically, but surely it makes no sense to behave as if we have already reached that ideal. And until we have (which seems unlikely to happen anytime soon or possibly ever), adversarial debate is a form of epistemic inquiry we will always have with us. So there must be right and wrong ways to go about doing it.
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
“Stubbornness” is just the refusal to immediately update. Whether it makes sense to continue defending a point, or whether it makes more sense to say “let me think about it and get back to you”, is contingent on various circumstantial aspects of the situation, the course of the discussion, etc. It does not seem to me like this point can make any substantive difference.
Perhaps not necessarily endorsing the actually existing distributions of certain traits in humans, perhaps generalizing slightly to “actually-existing humans but also very similar entities, humans under small plausible modifications, etc.”, but essentially still “actual humans”, and definitely not “hypothetical idealized Bayesian reasoners, which don’t exist and who maybe (probably?) can’t exist at all”.
I think this is an improperly narrow interpretation of the word now in the grandparent’s “I’ll take that retraction and apology now.” A retraction and apology in a few days after you’ve taken some time to cool down and reflect would be entirely in line with Schopenhauer’s advice. I await the possibility with cautious optimism.
I mean, I do think that (recall that I actually did the experiment with an LLM to demonstrate), but do you understand the rhetorical device I was invoking by using those exact words in the comment in question?
You had just disparagingly characterized Achmiz as “describing [interlocutors’] positions as laughable, obviously wrong, deeply corrosive, etc”. I was deliberately “biting the bullet” by choosing to express my literal disagreement with your hyperbolic insult using those same words verbatim, in order to stick up for the right to express disagreement using strong language when appropriate.
Just checking that you “got the joke.”
Please note that I had put a Disagree react on the phrase “normatively correct” on the comment in question. (The react was subsequently upvoted by Drake Morrison and Habryka.)
My actual position is subtler: I think Schopenhauer is correct to point out that it’s possible to concede an argument too early and that good outcomes often result from being obstinate in the heat of an argument and then reflecting at leisure later, but I think describing the obstinacy behavior as “normatively correct” is taking it way too far; that’s not what the word normative means.
I looked over the comment, while I think it was a reasonable stab at what I was trying to say, it didn’t quite meet my standards for expressing my opinion versus stating a verifiable fact, so I’ve edited it.
I’m happy that my comment is more accurate and I’m grateful to Said’s comment for that effect; I do think his comment about not-changing-your-mind-in-response-to-reason-or-argument being ‘normatively correct’ was misleading about his epistemic state (e.g. this also communicated the wrong thing to Zack).
I endorse this interpretation.
Who could possibly be disagree-voting with this comment? What does it even mean to disagree with me saying that I endorse someone’s interpretation of my own words?
I think that this position is reasonable, but wrong. On the other hand, perhaps we do not actually disagree on this point, as such, because of the next point:
I disagree. Elaborating:
Suppose that we are considering some class of situations, and two possible behaviors, A and B, in such a situation; and we are discussing which is the correct behavior in a situation of the given class. It may be the case (and we may claim) that any of the following hold:
Behavior A is always correct; behavior B is never correct.
Behavior B is always correct; behavior A is never correct.
In all cases, either A or B is fine; both are acceptable, neither is wrong.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong; in yet other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In certain situations of the given class, A is correct and B is wrong; in other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In certain situations of the given class, B is correct and A is wrong; in other situations of the given class, either A or B is fine.
In which of these scenarios would you assent to the claim that “A is normatively correct”?
My own position is that the answer is “all of the above except #2 and possibly #7”. (I can see a definitional argument based on #7, but I am not strongly committed to including it in the definition of “normative”.)
When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
(Example usage, bolding added: “Normatively, theories are preferred to the quantitative extent that they are simple and predict the observed data [...] For contingent evolutionary-psychological reasons, humans are innately biased to prefer ‘their own’ ideas, and in that context, a ‘principle of charity’ can be useful as a corrective heuristic—but the corrective heuristic only works by colliding the non-normative bias with a fairness instinct [...]”)
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
Understood. However, I am not sure that I approve of this usage; and it is certainly not how I use the word (or, to a first approximation, any words) myself. My comments are, unless specified otherwise, generally intended to refer to actually-existing humans.[1]
Indeed, so either we take this to mean that any normative claims about how to conduct such debates are necessarily meaningless, or else we allow for a concept of normativity that is not restricted to idealized Bayesian reasoners (which, I must remind you, are not actually real things that exist). Now, I am not saying that we should not identify an ideal and try to approach it asymptotically, but surely it makes no sense to behave as if we have already reached that ideal. And until we have (which seems unlikely to happen anytime soon or possibly ever), adversarial debate is a form of epistemic inquiry we will always have with us. So there must be right and wrong ways to go about doing it.
“Stubbornness” is just the refusal to immediately update. Whether it makes sense to continue defending a point, or whether it makes more sense to say “let me think about it and get back to you”, is contingent on various circumstantial aspects of the situation, the course of the discussion, etc. It does not seem to me like this point can make any substantive difference.
Perhaps not necessarily endorsing the actually existing distributions of certain traits in humans, perhaps generalizing slightly to “actually-existing humans but also very similar entities, humans under small plausible modifications, etc.”, but essentially still “actual humans”, and definitely not “hypothetical idealized Bayesian reasoners, which don’t exist and who maybe (probably?) can’t exist at all”.