When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
(Example usage, bolding added: “Normatively, theories are preferred to the quantitative extent that they are simple and predict the observed data [...] For contingent evolutionary-psychological reasons, humans are innately biased to prefer ‘their own’ ideas, and in that context, a ‘principle of charity’ can be useful as a corrective heuristic—but the corrective heuristic only works by colliding the non-normative bias with a fairness instinct [...]”)
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
Understood. However, I am not sure that I approve of this usage; and it is certainly not how I use the word (or, to a first approximation, any words) myself. My comments are, unless specified otherwise, generally intended to refer to actually-existing humans.[1]
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
Indeed, so either we take this to mean that any normative claims about how to conduct such debates are necessarily meaningless, or else we allow for a concept of normativity that is not restricted to idealized Bayesian reasoners (which, I must remind you, are not actually real things that exist). Now, I am not saying that we should not identify an ideal and try to approach it asymptotically, but surely it makes no sense to behave as if we have already reached that ideal. And until we have (which seems unlikely to happen anytime soon or possibly ever), adversarial debate is a form of epistemic inquiry we will always have with us. So there must be right and wrong ways to go about doing it.
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
“Stubbornness” is just the refusal to immediately update. Whether it makes sense to continue defending a point, or whether it makes more sense to say “let me think about it and get back to you”, is contingent on various circumstantial aspects of the situation, the course of the discussion, etc. It does not seem to me like this point can make any substantive difference.
Perhaps not necessarily endorsing the actually existing distributions of certain traits in humans, perhaps generalizing slightly to “actually-existing humans but also very similar entities, humans under small plausible modifications, etc.”, but essentially still “actual humans”, and definitely not “hypothetical idealized Bayesian reasoners, which don’t exist and who maybe (probably?) can’t exist at all”.
When discussing rationality, I typically use the word normative to refer to what idealized Bayesian reasoners would do, often in contrast to what humans do.
(Example usage, bolding added: “Normatively, theories are preferred to the quantitative extent that they are simple and predict the observed data [...] For contingent evolutionary-psychological reasons, humans are innately biased to prefer ‘their own’ ideas, and in that context, a ‘principle of charity’ can be useful as a corrective heuristic—but the corrective heuristic only works by colliding the non-normative bias with a fairness instinct [...]”)
As Schopenhauer observes, the entire concept of adversarial debate is non-normative!
“[N]ot demand[ing] [...] that a compelling argument be immediately accepted” is normatively correct insofar as even pretty idealized Bayesian reasoners would face computational constraints, but a “stubborn defense of one’s starting position—combined with a willingness [...] to change one’s mind later” isn’t normatively correct, because the stubbornness part comes from humans’ innate vanity rather than serving any functional purpose. You could just say, “Let me think about that and get back to you later.”
Understood. However, I am not sure that I approve of this usage; and it is certainly not how I use the word (or, to a first approximation, any words) myself. My comments are, unless specified otherwise, generally intended to refer to actually-existing humans.[1]
Indeed, so either we take this to mean that any normative claims about how to conduct such debates are necessarily meaningless, or else we allow for a concept of normativity that is not restricted to idealized Bayesian reasoners (which, I must remind you, are not actually real things that exist). Now, I am not saying that we should not identify an ideal and try to approach it asymptotically, but surely it makes no sense to behave as if we have already reached that ideal. And until we have (which seems unlikely to happen anytime soon or possibly ever), adversarial debate is a form of epistemic inquiry we will always have with us. So there must be right and wrong ways to go about doing it.
“Stubbornness” is just the refusal to immediately update. Whether it makes sense to continue defending a point, or whether it makes more sense to say “let me think about it and get back to you”, is contingent on various circumstantial aspects of the situation, the course of the discussion, etc. It does not seem to me like this point can make any substantive difference.
Perhaps not necessarily endorsing the actually existing distributions of certain traits in humans, perhaps generalizing slightly to “actually-existing humans but also very similar entities, humans under small plausible modifications, etc.”, but essentially still “actual humans”, and definitely not “hypothetical idealized Bayesian reasoners, which don’t exist and who maybe (probably?) can’t exist at all”.