As a guiding intuition, consider the case of white light, which was regarded as an intrinsic property of nature until Newton discovered that it is in fact composed of seven distinct colours. White light is an illusion in the sense that it does not possess an intrinsic property “whiteness” (even though it seems to). Suppose we manage to explain, with a high degree of precision, exactly how and when we perceive white, and why we perceive it the way we do. We do not subsequently need to formulate a “hard problem of whiteness” asking why, on top of this, whiteness arises. Illusionists claim that consciousness is an illusion in the same sense that whiteness is.[1]
What the explanation of white would be analogous to, if it existed, is a solution to the Hard Problem, in its own terms—an explanation of phenomenal consciousness, that doesn’t dismiss consciousness. Because the explanation of white light doesn’t tell you that there is no such thing, it just tells you that it is made of parts, non fundamental. (Confusion between reduction and elimination is rife).
White light isn’t a good example of an illusion: rainbows would be better.
There would be no need for a Hard Problem if there were no prima facie evidence for phenomenality … but there is. If there were not, there would be no need to explain away as an illusion.
So illusionists don’t deny that conscious experiences exist in some sense (we’re talking about them right now!). They deny that conscious experiences have a special kind of property: phenomenality (although they really seem to have phenomenality
Which means they have phenomenality, unless the seeming is cashed out in entirely cognitive terms.
The most common objection to illusionism is straightforward: how can consciousness be an illusion when I obviously feel pain
No the most common objection is that it is self defeating, in that it needs to appeal to one kind of phenomenally “quasi phenomenality” to explain away another.
Illusionism basically says this: once we have successfully explained all our reports about consciousness, there will be nothing left to explain.
But illusionism has no argument that it’s inevitable that reports will be reports of intrinsically subjective phenomena. Illusionist argument s always boil down to possibility.
There is little reason to expect evolution to enforce that our reports be correct
that it is more about phenomenal consciousness being non-representational—meaning something like that it has the type signature of a world-model without actually being a model of anything real (including itself).
That might be a more accurate version of what illusionists actually think, but it’s still incredible. Of course phenomenal consciousness is a model of the outside world: the quale Red represents certain frequencies of light, and so on.
Greatly appreciate the comment. I agree with most of it. As for the white light analogy, I’m definitely updating towards being less confident about it. Here is a perhaps stronger way of reframing it that I would be keen to get thoughts on:
Because the explanation of white light doesn’t tell you that there is no such thing, it just tells you that it is made of parts, non fundamental. (Confusion between reduction and elimination is rife).
So if I understand correctly, you’re saying that illusionism wants to eliminate phenomenal consciousness but that here I’m using a reduction analogy with white light. But I think both white light and consciousness deserve both treatments depending on what exactly we’re targeting.
Of course white light is real, and can be reduced to xyz. But now consider something like (and this is where I’m somewhat moving the goalposts compared to what I originally wrote) “whiteness as pure luminance”, then that can be eliminated. The analogy was chosen because pre-Newton white light was considered the purest, most fundamental form of light—with colours thought to be modifications or corruptions of this pure white light
For consciousness, illusionists seek to eliminate phenomenal consciousness but simply reduce so-called intuitions about consciousness. Eliminate the hard problem but simply reduce the meta-problem.
Thoughts?
Of course phenomenal consciousness is a model of the outside world: testable rd presents certain frequencies of light, and so on.
I’m not sure. The way I roughly see it, when you see red you have A) a representation that tracks red wavelengths and enables red-appropriate behaviours B) a representation of some additional “reddish feel”. The first one definitely models the outside world but the second is a systematic misrepresentation.
For consciousness, illusionists seek to eliminate phenomenal consciousness but simply reduce so-called intuitions about consciousness. Eliminate the hard problem but simply reduce the meta-problem.
Thoughts?
Thats what illusionist mean by illusionism, but you haven’t offered much motivation to believe it, and it needs motivation, because its far from obvious:-
Illusionists side with dualists in that they regard phenomenal consciousness as irreducible to physics. But their solution is a denial of phenomenal consciousness.
The motivation, therefore is a strong belief in physicalism. Note that the basic manouvre—saying that if E is apparently evidence against hypothesis H , E cannot be true—can be generalised to other areas , and can be used to “prove” almost anything. Note also that it’s a rejection of a widely accepted principle,that a scientific hypothesis should always be open to falsification.
Note also that the mystery or spookiness of Qualia isn’t intrinsic, it’s relative to expectations derived from physicalism. The ordinary person who is not versed in science and philosophy, doesn’t regard qualia as mysterious, in fact they regard colour qualua a as ninmental properties of external objects. And , on top of that, physics can be quite counter intuitive, it doesn’t equate to the non spooky.
Illusionism , as opposed to delusionism, has the further problem Th t it explains the illusion of Qualia as a quasi-phenomenal property: so it eliminates the kind of phenomenal properties for which there is direct evidence in favour of another kind for which there is none.
The way I roughly see it, when you see red you have A) a representation that tracks red wavelengths and enables red-appropriate behaviours B) a representation of some additional “reddish feel”. The first one definitely models the outside world but the second is a systematic misrepresentation.
That isn’t the way I see it in terms of direct experience. It sounds like a theory to me.
Thats what illusionist mean by illusionism, but you haven’t offered much motivation to believe it, and it needs motivation, because its far from obvious:-
Sure, right now I haven’t offered that much motivation. The post is already probably too long.
The motivation, therefore is a strong belief in physicalism. Note that the basic manouvre—saying that if E is apparently evidence against hypothesis H , E cannot be true—can be generalised to other areas , and can be used to “prove” almost anything
Agreed that this would be very bad reasoning. But some inference can still be drawn right. If you have very strong independent priors for H and I show E is apparently evidence against H then your credence in E might go down (as might your credence in H to be fair). That would be one prima facie motivation.
Illusionism , as opposed to delusionism, has the further problem Th t it explains the illusion of Qualia as a quasi-phenomenal property: so it eliminates the kind of phenomenal properties for which there is direct evidence in favour of another kind for which there is none.
This is where the big disagreement happens imo. Because illusionists would say the data to explain is “reports about qualia” and not “qualia” (Dennett spoke about heterophenomenology). And for that we have a lot of evidence.
Circling back to motivations, one I didn’t mention in the post is unreliability of introspection undercutting reasons to believe our intuitions about consciousness. A great book, Eric Schwitzgebel’s Perplexities of Consciousness, talks about this e.g. “do we dream in colours?” “can humans echolocate?” “Do you constantly experience your feet in your shoes?”.
One final prima facie motivation is that we should not necessarily expect evolution to produce transparent introspective access to our cognitive processes. Obviously there is some information being exchanged, but the representation only needs to be as faithful as survival demands.
This is where the big disagreement happens imo. Because illusionists would say the data to explain is “reports about qualia” and not “qualia
Whereas the anti illusionist thinks that’s failing to engage with the topic of consciousness at all. Having a dogma in favour of objective reports over subjective introspection isn’t much better than having a dogma in favour of ontological physicalism.
Circling back to motivations, one I didn’t mention in the post is unreliability of introspection undercutting reasons to believe our intuitions about consciousness
If intuition is the only evidence you have , it is the most reliable evidence you have.
Note that the case for nonphysicalism doesn’t have to depend on direct intuitions about nonphysicality.
A great book, Eric Schwitzgebel’s Perplexities of Consciousness, talks about this e.g. “do we dream in colours?” “can humans echolocate?” “Do you constantly experience your feet in your shoes?”.
We still have some sort of conscious experience even we don’t precisely know it. Ineffability is a way of not knowing it, and also a major problem.
Obviously there is some information being exchanged, but the representation only needs to be as faithful as survival demands
That’s not really the problem. Of course, introspection doesn’t reveal anything at all about neural activity. The question is what is going on instead. Introspection reveals a rich phenomenology that we don’t have a reductive explanation for.
ETA
We don’t have a reductive explanation of phenomenality , assumed to be real appearances, and we also don’t have a reductive explanation of (quasi) phenomenally assumed to be illusory appearances...and in fact, the two things are almost the same thing.
What the explanation of white would be analogous to, if it existed, is a solution to the Hard Problem, in its own terms—an explanation of phenomenal consciousness, that doesn’t dismiss consciousness. Because the explanation of white light doesn’t tell you that there is no such thing, it just tells you that it is made of parts, non fundamental. (Confusion between reduction and elimination is rife).
White light isn’t a good example of an illusion: rainbows would be better.
There would be no need for a Hard Problem if there were no prima facie evidence for phenomenality … but there is. If there were not, there would be no need to explain away as an illusion.
Which means they have phenomenality, unless the seeming is cashed out in entirely cognitive terms.
No the most common objection is that it is self defeating, in that it needs to appeal to one kind of phenomenally “quasi phenomenality” to explain away another.
But illusionism has no argument that it’s inevitable that reports will be reports of intrinsically subjective phenomena. Illusionist argument s always boil down to possibility.
@Adele Lopez
That might be a more accurate version of what illusionists actually think, but it’s still incredible. Of course phenomenal consciousness is a model of the outside world: the quale Red represents certain frequencies of light, and so on.
Greatly appreciate the comment. I agree with most of it. As for the white light analogy, I’m definitely updating towards being less confident about it. Here is a perhaps stronger way of reframing it that I would be keen to get thoughts on:
So if I understand correctly, you’re saying that illusionism wants to eliminate phenomenal consciousness but that here I’m using a reduction analogy with white light. But I think both white light and consciousness deserve both treatments depending on what exactly we’re targeting.
Of course white light is real, and can be reduced to xyz. But now consider something like (and this is where I’m somewhat moving the goalposts compared to what I originally wrote) “whiteness as pure luminance”, then that can be eliminated. The analogy was chosen because pre-Newton white light was considered the purest, most fundamental form of light—with colours thought to be modifications or corruptions of this pure white light
For consciousness, illusionists seek to eliminate phenomenal consciousness but simply reduce so-called intuitions about consciousness. Eliminate the hard problem but simply reduce the meta-problem.
Thoughts?
I’m not sure. The way I roughly see it, when you see red you have A) a representation that tracks red wavelengths and enables red-appropriate behaviours B) a representation of some additional “reddish feel”. The first one definitely models the outside world but the second is a systematic misrepresentation.
Thats what illusionist mean by illusionism, but you haven’t offered much motivation to believe it, and it needs motivation, because its far from obvious:-
Illusionists side with dualists in that they regard phenomenal consciousness as irreducible to physics. But their solution is a denial of phenomenal consciousness.
The motivation, therefore is a strong belief in physicalism. Note that the basic manouvre—saying that if E is apparently evidence against hypothesis H , E cannot be true—can be generalised to other areas , and can be used to “prove” almost anything. Note also that it’s a rejection of a widely accepted principle,that a scientific hypothesis should always be open to falsification.
Note also that the mystery or spookiness of Qualia isn’t intrinsic, it’s relative to expectations derived from physicalism. The ordinary person who is not versed in science and philosophy, doesn’t regard qualia as mysterious, in fact they regard colour qualua a as ninmental properties of external objects. And , on top of that, physics can be quite counter intuitive, it doesn’t equate to the non spooky.
Illusionism , as opposed to delusionism, has the further problem Th t it explains the illusion of Qualia as a quasi-phenomenal property: so it eliminates the kind of phenomenal properties for which there is direct evidence in favour of another kind for which there is none.
That isn’t the way I see it in terms of direct experience. It sounds like a theory to me.
Sure, right now I haven’t offered that much motivation. The post is already probably too long.
Agreed that this would be very bad reasoning. But some inference can still be drawn right. If you have very strong independent priors for H and I show E is apparently evidence against H then your credence in E might go down (as might your credence in H to be fair). That would be one prima facie motivation.
This is where the big disagreement happens imo. Because illusionists would say the data to explain is “reports about qualia” and not “qualia” (Dennett spoke about heterophenomenology). And for that we have a lot of evidence.
Circling back to motivations, one I didn’t mention in the post is unreliability of introspection undercutting reasons to believe our intuitions about consciousness. A great book, Eric Schwitzgebel’s Perplexities of Consciousness, talks about this e.g. “do we dream in colours?” “can humans echolocate?” “Do you constantly experience your feet in your shoes?”.
One final prima facie motivation is that we should not necessarily expect evolution to produce transparent introspective access to our cognitive processes. Obviously there is some information being exchanged, but the representation only needs to be as faithful as survival demands.
Whereas the anti illusionist thinks that’s failing to engage with the topic of consciousness at all. Having a dogma in favour of objective reports over subjective introspection isn’t much better than having a dogma in favour of ontological physicalism.
If intuition is the only evidence you have , it is the most reliable evidence you have.
Note that the case for nonphysicalism doesn’t have to depend on direct intuitions about nonphysicality.
We still have some sort of conscious experience even we don’t precisely know it. Ineffability is a way of not knowing it, and also a major problem.
That’s not really the problem. Of course, introspection doesn’t reveal anything at all about neural activity. The question is what is going on instead. Introspection reveals a rich phenomenology that we don’t have a reductive explanation for.
ETA
We don’t have a reductive explanation of phenomenality , assumed to be real appearances, and we also don’t have a reductive explanation of (quasi) phenomenally assumed to be illusory appearances...and in fact, the two things are almost the same thing.