This is conjecture. OP’s contrary statement was obviously overconfident, and they should probably think and read more on the topic. But the paper you linked to support your claim is ultimately just a more sophisticated set of appeals to intuition. You may find substrate-independence far more plausible than the alternative, but you haven’t given any good reason to hold it with the level of confidence you’re projecting here.
Chalmers’ paper is one of very many papers on this topic, but one that I would consider to be a good intro. It modestly presents itself as an appeal to intuitions, but its reasoning is very solid, drawing on necessary properties of qualia, and there is no alternative to the mind being substrate-independent—biological theories of consciousness are, in addition to the problems that the paper writes about, broken in multiple ways.
They’re not compatible with conscious aliens (not to mention conscious animals with different evolutionary ancestry, like octopuses) and our cognitive processes being implemented in a specific biology has no impact on our thoughts or cognition—if we evolved to be implemented by different biology, we would still make the same arguments, and think the same thoughts. The details of the implementation that don’t influence the underlying computation, like being made of specific biology, don’t causally influence our minds. They don’t even exist on the microstate level except as a human convention (it’s harder to see why implementing a pattern is more objectively real than implementing a higher-level entity like a brain, but it’s nevertheless the case). Etc. This isn’t one of those cases where being modest would be appropriate.
This is conjecture. OP’s contrary statement was obviously overconfident, and they should probably think and read more on the topic. But the paper you linked to support your claim is ultimately just a more sophisticated set of appeals to intuition. You may find substrate-independence far more plausible than the alternative, but you haven’t given any good reason to hold it with the level of confidence you’re projecting here.
Chalmers’ paper is one of very many papers on this topic, but one that I would consider to be a good intro. It modestly presents itself as an appeal to intuitions, but its reasoning is very solid, drawing on necessary properties of qualia, and there is no alternative to the mind being substrate-independent—biological theories of consciousness are, in addition to the problems that the paper writes about, broken in multiple ways.
They’re not compatible with conscious aliens (not to mention conscious animals with different evolutionary ancestry, like octopuses) and our cognitive processes being implemented in a specific biology has no impact on our thoughts or cognition—if we evolved to be implemented by different biology, we would still make the same arguments, and think the same thoughts. The details of the implementation that don’t influence the underlying computation, like being made of specific biology, don’t causally influence our minds. They don’t even exist on the microstate level except as a human convention (it’s harder to see why implementing a pattern is more objectively real than implementing a higher-level entity like a brain, but it’s nevertheless the case). Etc. This isn’t one of those cases where being modest would be appropriate.