But I feel a knot has to be made up of, a mathematically perfect line
There are various ways you can get a knot at a fundamental level. It can be a knot in field lines, it can be a knot in a “topological defect”, it can be a knot in a fundamental string.
what if they did a combination, where at each time step, some of your atoms are updated according to the simulation physics, while other atoms are updated using the past recording?
I don’t know if you’ve heard of it, but there is an algorithm for the cellular automaton “Game of Life”, called Hashlife, which functions like that. Hashlife remembers the state transitions arising from particular overall patterns, and when a Game of Life history is being computed, if a known pattern occurs, it just substitutes the memorized history rather than re-computing it from first principles.
So I take you to be asking, what are the implications for simulated beings, if Hashlife-style techniques are used to save costs in the simulation?
When thinking about simulated beings, the first thing to remember, if we are sticking to anything like a natural-scientific ontology, is that the ultimate truth about everything resides in the physics of the base reality. Everything that your computer does, consists of electrons shuttling among transistors. If there are simulated beings in your computer, that’s what they are made of.
If you’re simulating the Game of Life… at the level of software, at the level of some virtual machine, some cells may be updated one fundamental timestep at a time, by applying the basic dynamical rule; other cells may be updated en masse and in a timeskip, by retrieving a Hashlife memory. But either way, the fundamental causality is still electrons in transistors being pulled to and fro by electromagnetic forces.
Describing what happens inside a computer as 0s and 1s changing, or as calculation, or as simulation, is already an interpretive act that goes beyond the physics of what is happening there. It is the same thing as the fact that objectively, the letters on a printed page are just a bunch of shapes. But human readers have learned to interpret those shapes as propositions, descriptions, even as windows into other possible worlds.
If we look for objective facts about a computer that connect us to these intersubjective interpretations, there is the idea of virtual state machines. We divide up the distinct possible microphysical states, e.g. distributions of electrons within a transistor, and we say some distributions correspond to a “0” state, some correspond to a “1″ state, and others fall outside the range of meaningful states. We can define several tiers of abstraction in this way, and thereby attribute all kinds of intricate semantics to what’s going on in the computer. But from a strictly physical perspective, the only part of those meanings that’s actually there, are the causal relations. State x does cause state y, but state x is not intrinsically about the buildup of moisture in a virtual atmosphere, and state y is not intrinsically about rainfall. What is physically there, is a reconfigurable computational system designed to imitate the causality of whatever it’s simulating.
All of this is Scientific Philosophy of Mind 101. And because of modern neuroscience, people think they know that the human brain is just another form of the same thing, a physical system that contains a stack of virtual state machines; and they try to reason from that, to conclusions about the nature of consciousness. For example, that qualia must correspond to particular virtual states, and so that a simulation of a person can also be conscious, so long as the simulation is achieved by inducing the right virtual states in the simulator.
But—if I may simply jump to my own alternative philosophy—I propose that everything to do with consciousness, such as the qualia, depends directly on objective, exact, “microphysical” properties—which can include holistic properties like the topology of a fundamental knot, or the internal structure of an entangled quantum state. Mentally, psychologically, cognitively, the virtual states in a brain or a computer only tell us about things happening outside of its consciousness, like unconscious information processing.
This suggests a different kind of criterion for how much, and what kind of, consciousness there is in a simulation. For example, if we suppose that some form of entanglement is the physical touchstone of consciousness… then you may be simulating a person, but if your computer in base reality isn’t using entanglement to do so, then there’s no consciousness there at all.
Under this paradigm, it may still be possible e.g. to materialize a state of consciousness complete with the false impression that it had already been existing for a while. (Although it’s interesting that quantum informational states are subject to a wide variety of constraints on their production, e.g. the no-cloning theorem, or the need for “magic states” to run faster than a classical computer.) So there may still be epistemically disturbing possibilities that we’d have to come to terms with. But a theory of this nature at least assigns a robust reality to the existence of consciousness, qualia, and so forth.
I would not object to a theory of consciousness based solely on virtual states, that was equally robust. It’s just that virtual states, when you look at them from a microphysical perspective, always seem to have some fuzziness at the edges. Consider the computational interpretation of states of a transistor that I mentioned earlier. It’s a “0” if the electrons are all on one side, it’s a “1“ if they’re all on the other side, and it’s a meaningless state if it’s neither of those. But the problem is that the boundary between computational states isn’t physically absolute. If you have stray electrons floating around, there isn’t some threshold where it sharply and objectively stops being a “0” state, it’s just that the more loose electrons you have, the greater the risk that the transistor will fail to perform the causal role required for it to accurately represent a “0” in the dance of the logic gates.
This physical non-objectivity of computational states is my version of the problems that were giving you headaches in the earlier comment. Fortunately, I know there’s more to physics than Newtonian billard balls rebounding from each other, and that leads to some possibilities for a genuinely holistic ontology of mind.
There are various ways you can get a knot at a fundamental level. It can be a knot in field lines, it can be a knot in a “topological defect”, it can be a knot in a fundamental string.
I don’t know if you’ve heard of it, but there is an algorithm for the cellular automaton “Game of Life”, called Hashlife, which functions like that. Hashlife remembers the state transitions arising from particular overall patterns, and when a Game of Life history is being computed, if a known pattern occurs, it just substitutes the memorized history rather than re-computing it from first principles.
So I take you to be asking, what are the implications for simulated beings, if Hashlife-style techniques are used to save costs in the simulation?
When thinking about simulated beings, the first thing to remember, if we are sticking to anything like a natural-scientific ontology, is that the ultimate truth about everything resides in the physics of the base reality. Everything that your computer does, consists of electrons shuttling among transistors. If there are simulated beings in your computer, that’s what they are made of.
If you’re simulating the Game of Life… at the level of software, at the level of some virtual machine, some cells may be updated one fundamental timestep at a time, by applying the basic dynamical rule; other cells may be updated en masse and in a timeskip, by retrieving a Hashlife memory. But either way, the fundamental causality is still electrons in transistors being pulled to and fro by electromagnetic forces.
Describing what happens inside a computer as 0s and 1s changing, or as calculation, or as simulation, is already an interpretive act that goes beyond the physics of what is happening there. It is the same thing as the fact that objectively, the letters on a printed page are just a bunch of shapes. But human readers have learned to interpret those shapes as propositions, descriptions, even as windows into other possible worlds.
If we look for objective facts about a computer that connect us to these intersubjective interpretations, there is the idea of virtual state machines. We divide up the distinct possible microphysical states, e.g. distributions of electrons within a transistor, and we say some distributions correspond to a “0” state, some correspond to a “1″ state, and others fall outside the range of meaningful states. We can define several tiers of abstraction in this way, and thereby attribute all kinds of intricate semantics to what’s going on in the computer. But from a strictly physical perspective, the only part of those meanings that’s actually there, are the causal relations. State x does cause state y, but state x is not intrinsically about the buildup of moisture in a virtual atmosphere, and state y is not intrinsically about rainfall. What is physically there, is a reconfigurable computational system designed to imitate the causality of whatever it’s simulating.
All of this is Scientific Philosophy of Mind 101. And because of modern neuroscience, people think they know that the human brain is just another form of the same thing, a physical system that contains a stack of virtual state machines; and they try to reason from that, to conclusions about the nature of consciousness. For example, that qualia must correspond to particular virtual states, and so that a simulation of a person can also be conscious, so long as the simulation is achieved by inducing the right virtual states in the simulator.
But—if I may simply jump to my own alternative philosophy—I propose that everything to do with consciousness, such as the qualia, depends directly on objective, exact, “microphysical” properties—which can include holistic properties like the topology of a fundamental knot, or the internal structure of an entangled quantum state. Mentally, psychologically, cognitively, the virtual states in a brain or a computer only tell us about things happening outside of its consciousness, like unconscious information processing.
This suggests a different kind of criterion for how much, and what kind of, consciousness there is in a simulation. For example, if we suppose that some form of entanglement is the physical touchstone of consciousness… then you may be simulating a person, but if your computer in base reality isn’t using entanglement to do so, then there’s no consciousness there at all.
Under this paradigm, it may still be possible e.g. to materialize a state of consciousness complete with the false impression that it had already been existing for a while. (Although it’s interesting that quantum informational states are subject to a wide variety of constraints on their production, e.g. the no-cloning theorem, or the need for “magic states” to run faster than a classical computer.) So there may still be epistemically disturbing possibilities that we’d have to come to terms with. But a theory of this nature at least assigns a robust reality to the existence of consciousness, qualia, and so forth.
I would not object to a theory of consciousness based solely on virtual states, that was equally robust. It’s just that virtual states, when you look at them from a microphysical perspective, always seem to have some fuzziness at the edges. Consider the computational interpretation of states of a transistor that I mentioned earlier. It’s a “0” if the electrons are all on one side, it’s a “1“ if they’re all on the other side, and it’s a meaningless state if it’s neither of those. But the problem is that the boundary between computational states isn’t physically absolute. If you have stray electrons floating around, there isn’t some threshold where it sharply and objectively stops being a “0” state, it’s just that the more loose electrons you have, the greater the risk that the transistor will fail to perform the causal role required for it to accurately represent a “0” in the dance of the logic gates.
This physical non-objectivity of computational states is my version of the problems that were giving you headaches in the earlier comment. Fortunately, I know there’s more to physics than Newtonian billard balls rebounding from each other, and that leads to some possibilities for a genuinely holistic ontology of mind.