This is a very common belief. I’ve even seen seasoned mathematicians and AI gurus make this mistake, often unwittingly.
It’s no mistake. There good research that pattern matching works and human brains are good at it. No expert wins at Chess or Go with a strategy that’s based in logic.
When we move to more formal ontology, we can think of logic as predicate calculus. David Chapman argues in Probality and Logic that logic usually means predicate calculus when used by experts.
Barry Smith who does applied ontology for bioinformatics argues in against Fantology that a lot of important knowledge is not represented by predicate calculus. Barry approach to ontology seems to be well accepted within bioinformatics to be useful in practice.
If you look at standard semiotics reasoning by the way of metaphar is not a process that fits into predicate calculus. If you accept that there are cases where people draw correct judgements by reasoning with the help of metaphars and you use the standard formal definition of logic, than you are dealing with reasoning processes that are not logic based. It’s very worthwhile to study how those reasoning processes work and how to reason well with metaphars.
At the same time I’m not sure whether Lacan or Derrida succeeded at producing useful knowledge that helps for practical contexts in the way someone like Barry Smith succeeded in producing useful knowledge.
It’s no mistake. There good research that pattern matching works and human brains are good at it. No expert wins at Chess or Go with a strategy that’s based in logic.
When we move to more formal ontology, we can think of logic as predicate calculus. David Chapman argues in Probality and Logic that logic usually means predicate calculus when used by experts. Barry Smith who does applied ontology for bioinformatics argues in against Fantology that a lot of important knowledge is not represented by predicate calculus. Barry approach to ontology seems to be well accepted within bioinformatics to be useful in practice.
If you look at standard semiotics reasoning by the way of metaphar is not a process that fits into predicate calculus. If you accept that there are cases where people draw correct judgements by reasoning with the help of metaphars and you use the standard formal definition of logic, than you are dealing with reasoning processes that are not logic based. It’s very worthwhile to study how those reasoning processes work and how to reason well with metaphars. At the same time I’m not sure whether Lacan or Derrida succeeded at producing useful knowledge that helps for practical contexts in the way someone like Barry Smith succeeded in producing useful knowledge.