At this point I would be mildly surprised (though pleased) to discover that there was any metaphysically significant “reality fluid,” mostly because it seems that even in a universe without any everyone would have all of the same evidence for its existence that we do. “What the physical world actually looks like” seems likely to be a matter of preferences (perhaps combined with considerations of accessibility, though if you are willing to grant that inaccessible regions of the universe really exist, you probably are reduced to preferences).
If your preferences are sensitive to your own physical existence (for example if you don’t care what happens whenever you don’t actually exist) then there is a straightforward conflict of values between the two copies in the mugging (which can be resolved by bargaining in the usual way). If not then as you say its not clear why whether the decision-maker physically exists or not ought to have any significance to the problem.
My bet as to the best approach (and even my best bet as to what we will retrospectively regard as the best approach) is to accept a probable or at least plausible dependence of “really exist” on preferences, and to live full and satisfying lives while dealing with things honestly. Doing otherwise seems too likely to create problems down the line.
That said, it looks quite likely that these considerations (fortunately?) don’t affect what we ought to do. If you are able, and comfortable enough with that “likely,” to avoid thinking about them then that might be an even better response, due to opportunity costs. And if we are in a world where these strange considerations do importantly affect what we ought to do, then it seems particularly hazardous to entertain philosophically unwarranted positions for psychological comfort . So probably I’d go with one of “avoid thinking about it” or “move away from ascribing metaphysical signifcance to existing,” or at least moving towards a state of ignorance.
At this point I would be mildly surprised (though pleased) to discover that there was any metaphysically significant “reality fluid,” mostly because it seems that even in a universe without any everyone would have all of the same evidence for its existence that we do.
Is it a trivial mistake that I am thinking of quantum amplitudes as a sort of “magical reality fluid”? Isn’t something like that needed for an explanation of why we live in a world where all our measurements seem to have followed the modulus squared law with respect to this number?
At this point I would be mildly surprised (though pleased) to discover that there was any metaphysically significant “reality fluid,” mostly because it seems that even in a universe without any everyone would have all of the same evidence for its existence that we do.
Well, it would need to exist at all..isn’t that reality fluid? Are you defining reality fluid as continuously variable, not binary.
And if we are in a world where these strange considerations do importantly affect what we ought to do, then it seems particularly hazardous to entertain philosophically unwarranted positions for psychological comfort .
I find myself confused by this sentence. If the strange considerations affect what we ought to do, why are they unwarranted? Or do you mean that considering them will lead us to change what we think we ought to do, but the change will be unwarranted because so were the considerations?
(And just to make sure I’m following you, are the considerations we are talking about in this paragraph those related to the question of whether reality depends on preferences?)
At this point I would be mildly surprised (though pleased) to discover that there was any metaphysically significant “reality fluid,” mostly because it seems that even in a universe without any everyone would have all of the same evidence for its existence that we do. “What the physical world actually looks like” seems likely to be a matter of preferences (perhaps combined with considerations of accessibility, though if you are willing to grant that inaccessible regions of the universe really exist, you probably are reduced to preferences).
If your preferences are sensitive to your own physical existence (for example if you don’t care what happens whenever you don’t actually exist) then there is a straightforward conflict of values between the two copies in the mugging (which can be resolved by bargaining in the usual way). If not then as you say its not clear why whether the decision-maker physically exists or not ought to have any significance to the problem.
My bet as to the best approach (and even my best bet as to what we will retrospectively regard as the best approach) is to accept a probable or at least plausible dependence of “really exist” on preferences, and to live full and satisfying lives while dealing with things honestly. Doing otherwise seems too likely to create problems down the line.
That said, it looks quite likely that these considerations (fortunately?) don’t affect what we ought to do. If you are able, and comfortable enough with that “likely,” to avoid thinking about them then that might be an even better response, due to opportunity costs. And if we are in a world where these strange considerations do importantly affect what we ought to do, then it seems particularly hazardous to entertain philosophically unwarranted positions for psychological comfort . So probably I’d go with one of “avoid thinking about it” or “move away from ascribing metaphysical signifcance to existing,” or at least moving towards a state of ignorance.
Is it a trivial mistake that I am thinking of quantum amplitudes as a sort of “magical reality fluid”? Isn’t something like that needed for an explanation of why we live in a world where all our measurements seem to have followed the modulus squared law with respect to this number?
Well, it would need to exist at all..isn’t that reality fluid? Are you defining reality fluid as continuously variable, not binary.
I find myself confused by this sentence. If the strange considerations affect what we ought to do, why are they unwarranted? Or do you mean that considering them will lead us to change what we think we ought to do, but the change will be unwarranted because so were the considerations?
(And just to make sure I’m following you, are the considerations we are talking about in this paragraph those related to the question of whether reality depends on preferences?)