it’s kinda difficult to decide what the concept of free will means
But it’s possible to divide and conquer . to treat specific meanings separately, for instance, compatibilist and libertarian free will.
Different definitions of free will require freedom from different things. Much of the debate centres on Libertarian free will, which requires freedom from complete causal determinism (an therefore, freedom from inevitability) Compatibilist definitions of free will only require freedom from compulsion, and allow free will to exist in a deterministic universe. Sam Harris believes free will is a form of conscious control.
Libertarian free will has sub-varieties. One is “contra causal” free will, which requires freedom from physics, on the assumption that physics is deterministic. This is often connected with the idea of a supernatural soul, that is able to override the physics of the brain. In contrast, naturalistic libertarians seek to find free will within physics, by rejecting physical determinism; they regard indeterminism as a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition of free will
Yudkowsky considers the problem of free will to be easy, in contrast to professional philosophers. He believes that he has dissolved the problem, that is, shown that it never was a problem, that it’s all based on a confusion. However, his solution ultimately sides with compatibilism and against libertarianism.
He rejects dualism , insisting “Thou Art Physics”, a claim which only directly contradicts supernatural, contra-causal libertarianism. Physics is not known to be deterministic, so Thou Art Physics doesn’t exclude libertarian free will via the usual route of removing “elbow room” , or “could have done otherwise”.
He proposes a theory where the feeling of libertarian free will is explained naturaliststically, as an illusion, without the existence of an actual power of free will. But it is also possible to construct theories of non-magical ,non-dualistic free will, such as Robert Kane’s naturalistic libertarianism. Such theories also account for the existence of a quale of free will, but this time as a accurate perception of a real ability. So Yudkowsky has an explanation, not the only possible one …. his solution is example of an a/the fallacy.
If he had an argument for determinism on top of physicalism, he could close the loophole and exclude naturalistic libertarianism as well as supernaturalistic libertarianism. Instead, he ignores the possibility.
Note that naturalistic libertarianism relies on physical indeterminism. Since indeterminism. . is not known to be true, it could turn out to be unworkable on evidence of determinism...but physical indeterminism is still a respectable naturalistic hypothesis that doesn’t require ghosts or magic.
How would particles or humans behave differently if they had free will compared to if they didn’t
Indeterminism is a component of naturalistic libertarian free will , and indeterministic behaviour in particles is detectable. (See Bell’s inequalities and the Aspect experiment). Fundamental indeterminism probably isn’t sufficient for free will, but the other components of NLFW, such as specific neural mechanisms, are testable—they would hardly be naturalistic otherwise!
Yudkowsky also claims that determinism is required for free will. Requiredism holds that determinism is an advantage to fee will because the connection between a decision and the resulting action is deterministic.
But we have no evidence of a 100% ’reliable connection between thought and action, so strict determinism is not necessary for the kind of decision making we observe that n ourselves—it’s overkill.
Randomness, or at least, too much randomness in the wrong place, would prevent me from acting reliably on my decisions Of course, determinism also removes the elbow room, the the ability to have decided differently, that is of such concern to libertarians—that is, to them, the “free” in “free will’.Determinism is only an overall advantage to free will if elbow room is unimportant or impossible, so requiredism needs compatibilism as a starting point. -- hence its other name, supercompatibilism.
But it’s possible to divide and conquer . to treat specific meanings separately, for instance, compatibilist and libertarian free will.
Different definitions of free will require freedom from different things. Much of the debate centres on Libertarian free will, which requires freedom from complete causal determinism (an therefore, freedom from inevitability) Compatibilist definitions of free will only require freedom from compulsion, and allow free will to exist in a deterministic universe. Sam Harris believes free will is a form of conscious control.
Libertarian free will has sub-varieties. One is “contra causal” free will, which requires freedom from physics, on the assumption that physics is deterministic. This is often connected with the idea of a supernatural soul, that is able to override the physics of the brain. In contrast, naturalistic libertarians seek to find free will within physics, by rejecting physical determinism; they regard indeterminism as a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition of free will
Yudkowsky considers the problem of free will to be easy, in contrast to professional philosophers. He believes that he has dissolved the problem, that is, shown that it never was a problem, that it’s all based on a confusion. However, his solution ultimately sides with compatibilism and against libertarianism.
He rejects dualism , insisting “Thou Art Physics”, a claim which only directly contradicts supernatural, contra-causal libertarianism. Physics is not known to be deterministic, so Thou Art Physics doesn’t exclude libertarian free will via the usual route of removing “elbow room” , or “could have done otherwise”.
He proposes a theory where the feeling of libertarian free will is explained naturaliststically, as an illusion, without the existence of an actual power of free will. But it is also possible to construct theories of non-magical ,non-dualistic free will, such as Robert Kane’s naturalistic libertarianism. Such theories also account for the existence of a quale of free will, but this time as a accurate perception of a real ability. So Yudkowsky has an explanation, not the only possible one …. his solution is example of an a/the fallacy.
If he had an argument for determinism on top of physicalism, he could close the loophole and exclude naturalistic libertarianism as well as supernaturalistic libertarianism. Instead, he ignores the possibility.
Note that naturalistic libertarianism relies on physical indeterminism. Since indeterminism. . is not known to be true, it could turn out to be unworkable on evidence of determinism...but physical indeterminism is still a respectable naturalistic hypothesis that doesn’t require ghosts or magic.
Indeterminism is a component of naturalistic libertarian free will , and indeterministic behaviour in particles is detectable. (See Bell’s inequalities and the Aspect experiment). Fundamental indeterminism probably isn’t sufficient for free will, but the other components of NLFW, such as specific neural mechanisms, are testable—they would hardly be naturalistic otherwise!
Yudkowsky also claims that determinism is required for free will. Requiredism holds that determinism is an advantage to fee will because the connection between a decision and the resulting action is deterministic.
But we have no evidence of a 100% ’reliable connection between thought and action, so strict determinism is not necessary for the kind of decision making we observe that n ourselves—it’s overkill.
Randomness, or at least, too much randomness in the wrong place, would prevent me from acting reliably on my decisions Of course, determinism also removes the elbow room, the the ability to have decided differently, that is of such concern to libertarians—that is, to them, the “free” in “free will’.Determinism is only an overall advantage to free will if elbow room is unimportant or impossible, so requiredism needs compatibilism as a starting point. -- hence its other name, supercompatibilism.