There’s a certain non-zero probability that electrons can suffer.
It’s possible that David Chalmers would endorse the idea that electrons could at least have some kind of phenomenological experience.
However, I would bet that shrimp can somehow suffer, because pain is an evolutionary advantage that would have been selected for very early, maybe as early as worms. While I don’t think there would be any reason that electrons should feel pain, if they feel anything at all.
You don’t think there’s any reason, but that just makes your estimate of its likelihood very small. It doesn’t make it exactly zero. And unless it’s exactly zero, when multiplied by infinity, this still overwhelms everything else, just like it does for the shrimp.
It’s possible that David Chalmers would endorse the idea that electrons could at least have some kind of phenomenological experience.
However, I would bet that shrimp can somehow suffer, because pain is an evolutionary advantage that would have been selected for very early, maybe as early as worms. While I don’t think there would be any reason that electrons should feel pain, if they feel anything at all.
You don’t think there’s any reason, but that just makes your estimate of its likelihood very small. It doesn’t make it exactly zero. And unless it’s exactly zero, when multiplied by infinity, this still overwhelms everything else, just like it does for the shrimp.