I’d guess that the people who arguing for linearity are more extrapolating from their horror at the thought of their own death, rather than the pleasure of saving other peoples lives.
That’s probably correct, at least in my own case. I don’t try to save people because I like the thought of having saved a lot of people, but because (a) they don’t want to die or (b) total annihilation is far too horrible a punishment for their mistake. Seeing the portion of the movie where everyone cheers the hero doesn’t move me much; a certain scene in which a sick young girl screams that she’s afraid, she doesn’t want to die, and then she dies, will stay with me until I end Death or it ends me.
Does that get us any closer to the position that we should assign value to other people’s lives, value that is in addition to how those lives affect our feelings?
How do you cross the gap from “I feel bad (or good) about this” to “I should assign a value to this independent of my feelings” and not have that same argument apply to boredom?
When thinking more clearly about your feeling doesn’t make it go away. Really, maybe boredom is a bad example. We definitely wouldn’t want to potentially feel arbitrarily much boredom if we couldn’t escape from it.
I hesitate to imagine others’ death and suffering as my own (in other words, to really empathize), although doing so in the context of a good film or book is quite pleasurable.
I’d guess that the people who arguing for linearity are more extrapolating from their horror at the thought of their own death, rather than the pleasure of saving other peoples lives.
That’s probably correct, at least in my own case. I don’t try to save people because I like the thought of having saved a lot of people, but because (a) they don’t want to die or (b) total annihilation is far too horrible a punishment for their mistake. Seeing the portion of the movie where everyone cheers the hero doesn’t move me much; a certain scene in which a sick young girl screams that she’s afraid, she doesn’t want to die, and then she dies, will stay with me until I end Death or it ends me.
Does that get us any closer to the position that we should assign value to other people’s lives, value that is in addition to how those lives affect our feelings?
How do you cross the gap from “I feel bad (or good) about this” to “I should assign a value to this independent of my feelings” and not have that same argument apply to boredom?
When thinking more clearly about your feeling doesn’t make it go away. Really, maybe boredom is a bad example. We definitely wouldn’t want to potentially feel arbitrarily much boredom if we couldn’t escape from it.
Michael, your first sentence seems completely ungrammatical. I can’t parse it or guess its meaning.
I hesitate to imagine others’ death and suffering as my own (in other words, to really empathize), although doing so in the context of a good film or book is quite pleasurable.