But it also creates an incentive to bring lots of annoying stuff to vote to force your political enemies to vote for it. For example, if you put “Deport all Rationalists” up for vote as often as possible, you can prevent Rationalists from voting for anything else.
Well, if rationalists are a minority, with no external limits on the agenda, they can be deported anyway.
I only have considered a case with external agenda setting (issues with variable relevance exogenously arrive), as is typical to turn voting into a mathematical problem.
The second paper is about the context of voting systems. What I argue there is that the structure of the voting space is more important than the voting system.
What shall people vote? They shall vote among feasible states of the world.
Well, if rationalists are a minority, with no external limits on the agenda, they can be deported anyway.
If voting to do X doesn’t matter because X could be done anyway without a vote, why wouldn’t that apply to other things than just deporting rationalists? The logical endpoint of this is that votes will be useless, because anything that is voted for could be done anyway without a vote.
And if some things can’t be done without a vote, exactly what are they, and why can’t “something that would really harm rationalists” be one of them?
What I claim, is that with enough agenda setting manipulation you can nullify the properties of any voting system.
In my opinion, SV-PAYW is the best “voting system” available, but the mechanism has been analyzed under explicit hypoteses on the randomness of issues to be voted. The stream of political issues (represented by the valuation of the participants of an electoral victory) is supposed to be stochastic i.i.d.
If “deporting rationalists” is possible, and rationalists are not more than half of people, I don’t see what security can they receive under any electoral system. If you can vote “disefranchise group X”, then any minority group can be removed from the political system.
I was about to say that I explicitely deal with that issue on “the ideal political workflow”, but there is nothing to deal with.
If “deporting rationalists” is possible, and rationalists are not more than half of people, I don’t see what security can they receive under any electoral system.
If deporting rationalists is possible and rationalists are more than half of people, there’s still no security they can receive, by your reasoning. After all, you’re postulating that it would be possible to deport rationalists before taking a vote on whether to do so. Before the vote, the fact that they’re more than half doesn’t matter.
Like the parent said “Deport all Rationalists” or even “Deport everyone named Arturo Macias” are entirely feasible to accomplish with available resources…
It seems like the more important issue is who gets to decide what to vote on and what is presented for voting?
e.g. if the limit is say 1 vote per day, allowing for sufficient time for reflection and study of the issue at hand assuming perfect allocation of time, there’s still way more then 365 possible things a year to vote on.
But it also creates an incentive to bring lots of annoying stuff to vote to force your political enemies to vote for it. For example, if you put “Deport all Rationalists” up for vote as often as possible, you can prevent Rationalists from voting for anything else.
Well, if rationalists are a minority, with no external limits on the agenda, they can be deported anyway.
I only have considered a case with external agenda setting (issues with variable relevance exogenously arrive), as is typical to turn voting into a mathematical problem.
The second paper is about the context of voting systems. What I argue there is that the structure of the voting space is more important than the voting system.
What shall people vote? They shall vote among feasible states of the world.
If voting to do X doesn’t matter because X could be done anyway without a vote, why wouldn’t that apply to other things than just deporting rationalists? The logical endpoint of this is that votes will be useless, because anything that is voted for could be done anyway without a vote.
And if some things can’t be done without a vote, exactly what are they, and why can’t “something that would really harm rationalists” be one of them?
What I claim, is that with enough agenda setting manipulation you can nullify the properties of any voting system.
In my opinion, SV-PAYW is the best “voting system” available, but the mechanism has been analyzed under explicit hypoteses on the randomness of issues to be voted. The stream of political issues (represented by the valuation of the participants of an electoral victory) is supposed to be stochastic i.i.d.
If “deporting rationalists” is possible, and rationalists are not more than half of people, I don’t see what security can they receive under any electoral system. If you can vote “disefranchise group X”, then any minority group can be removed from the political system.
I was about to say that I explicitely deal with that issue on “the ideal political workflow”, but there is nothing to deal with.
If deporting rationalists is possible and rationalists are more than half of people, there’s still no security they can receive, by your reasoning. After all, you’re postulating that it would be possible to deport rationalists before taking a vote on whether to do so. Before the vote, the fact that they’re more than half doesn’t matter.
Like the parent said “Deport all Rationalists” or even “Deport everyone named Arturo Macias” are entirely feasible to accomplish with available resources…
It seems like the more important issue is who gets to decide what to vote on and what is presented for voting?
e.g. if the limit is say 1 vote per day, allowing for sufficient time for reflection and study of the issue at hand assuming perfect allocation of time, there’s still way more then 365 possible things a year to vote on.