That answer just raises more questions. How do new voters get votes, and what happens to deceased or newly-ineligible voter’s “stored votes”? Are votes transferable (or sellable)?
Money is very rather different from votes; there’s zero expectation of “fair distribution” or “equal weight”. That’s why we have different things for different purposes.
You COULD just do away with voting and use currency auctions. I think a lot of people would object.
This is the QV and I find it wrong. With money, at the end pivotal votes are only those of the largest money owners. Who can give money for collective choices? Those that can recover it, because their wealth is so large than individual consequences of collective decision is individually profitable. Keeping the political system separated from general purpose currency is critical (the Casella and Mace review agrees). The system as described in the paper is totally parallel to currency, while it works like it in the sense that you only pay votes when you get your alternative.
In SV PAYW the fixed number of votes is redistributed among voters after any election (votes casted in the winning alternative are those “payed”) in a one-vote one-man way. Even with no new votes for new players (and the votes from the dead are available for redistribution), new voters receive votes from the winners of each election.
A final remark: SV PAYW is more spectacular, but “the ideal political workflow” is more important.
That answer just raises more questions. How do new voters get votes, and what happens to deceased or newly-ineligible voter’s “stored votes”? Are votes transferable (or sellable)?
Money is very rather different from votes; there’s zero expectation of “fair distribution” or “equal weight”. That’s why we have different things for different purposes.
You COULD just do away with voting and use currency auctions. I think a lot of people would object.
This is the QV and I find it wrong. With money, at the end pivotal votes are only those of the largest money owners. Who can give money for collective choices? Those that can recover it, because their wealth is so large than individual consequences of collective decision is individually profitable. Keeping the political system separated from general purpose currency is critical (the Casella and Mace review agrees). The system as described in the paper is totally parallel to currency, while it works like it in the sense that you only pay votes when you get your alternative.
In SV PAYW the fixed number of votes is redistributed among voters after any election (votes casted in the winning alternative are those “payed”) in a one-vote one-man way. Even with no new votes for new players (and the votes from the dead are available for redistribution), new voters receive votes from the winners of each election.
A final remark: SV PAYW is more spectacular, but “the ideal political workflow” is more important.