Looking at the data collection, region and country are fairly straightforward, but “Europe” could mean a wide variety of things to a wide variety of people, meaning that the identification numbers might overestimate attachment to the EU as a political structure. Someone might feel attached to the historical Europe, as a cultural and technological force, yet not consider the EU to be meaningfully connected to it.
More directly, I think the core issue that the EU faces is that of interests. Every strong or rising power today can point to a clear set of interests motivating its base of power (usually a majority of citizens) to support it:
The PRC can advertise that it has made its citizens wealthier by facilitating nation-wide industrialization and negotiating trade agreements that have greatly increased living standards. Likewise, it can point to China’s pre-PRC experience under the influence of foreign powers, and the more recent experience of some nearby countries, to claim that this newfound wealth isn’t possible without a strong central government to keep other powers from using the threat of force to rent-seek. Moreover, the PRC can claim that the interests of China are the interests of the overwhelming majority of its current citizens’ descendants—even if they happen to live elsewhere.
Russia can point to the early post-Soviet years as an example of what happens when there isn’t a strong, independent government serving as a check on foreign investors and local oligarchs. Moreover, there is certainly a perception—starting with the Bush administration appearing to spurn early attempts at reconciliation - that the U.S. has committed to being an enemy of Russia, and that without central coordination of resources to deter them, they would forcibly bring back the bad old days of state-permitted looting of everything not nailed down by anyone with a carpet bag full of money. Also, as with the above, it is generally understood that people can be intrinsically Russian regardless of their citizenship, and that their fates are intertwined with the fate of the Russian government. <Backlash / Discrimination, depending on your political leanings> against overseas ethnic Russians post-2020 has cemented this.
America, in part due to ongoing polarization, has two separate proposals to two somewhat-separate bases of power.
To a degree, it is still a nation-state, and can claim that a wealthy America provides opportunities for people who are descendants of the historical American nation. This is a bit less intense than in the above two countries, since these Americans could renounce citizenship and become a fully-assimilated Australian/Spanish/Austrian within the span of one generation, if so inclined, but there is still a perception that the umbrella of American hegemony provides leverage to ordinary citizens. It’s this perception that keeps the pointy end of the U.S. military well-staffed.
The second proposal is as a somewhat international collective of elites, where they can come together to make sure the world remains a good place to do business, and negotiate with “rogue” actors from a shared position of strength. Everyone can attend the same fundraisers, invest in the same companies, and send their children to the same universities to network with each other. Notably, it’s this perception that allows the U.S. to arrange things like the stand-down that enabled the <Arrest / Kidnapping, depending on your political leanings> of Maduro by appealing to local elites who might want their kids to go to Harvard.
A shared language and some cultural overlap isn’t enough to create a nation—there have to be shared interests that motivate people to be willing to work and fight in the interest of the collective.
From what I’ve seen, there is a core political class in Europe which serves as the EU’s base of power and is glad to provide it with support in exchange for coordinating the funding of friendly NGOs and helping to oppose non-aligned political movements, but this is a relatively small group that does not enjoy universal popularity. To meaningfully counterbalance America, Russia, and China, there would need to be a common cause that a large number of people are willing to go above and beyond for—the sort of thing makes workers do more than they’re paid to do and makes soldiers willing to fight rather than rout. The usual motivation is something along the lines of “This nation is the exclusive property of all of your descendants, forever, and the blood and sweat you invest will never be lost to them”, but the Venn diagram of people advocating that for Europe and people who support the EU is very close to two nonintersecting circles.
Looking at the data collection, region and country are fairly straightforward, but “Europe” could mean a wide variety of things to a wide variety of people, meaning that the identification numbers might overestimate attachment to the EU as a political structure. Someone might feel attached to the historical Europe, as a cultural and technological force, yet not consider the EU to be meaningfully connected to it.
More directly, I think the core issue that the EU faces is that of interests. Every strong or rising power today can point to a clear set of interests motivating its base of power (usually a majority of citizens) to support it:
The PRC can advertise that it has made its citizens wealthier by facilitating nation-wide industrialization and negotiating trade agreements that have greatly increased living standards. Likewise, it can point to China’s pre-PRC experience under the influence of foreign powers, and the more recent experience of some nearby countries, to claim that this newfound wealth isn’t possible without a strong central government to keep other powers from using the threat of force to rent-seek. Moreover, the PRC can claim that the interests of China are the interests of the overwhelming majority of its current citizens’ descendants—even if they happen to live elsewhere.
Russia can point to the early post-Soviet years as an example of what happens when there isn’t a strong, independent government serving as a check on foreign investors and local oligarchs. Moreover, there is certainly a perception—starting with the Bush administration appearing to spurn early attempts at reconciliation - that the U.S. has committed to being an enemy of Russia, and that without central coordination of resources to deter them, they would forcibly bring back the bad old days of state-permitted looting of everything not nailed down by anyone with a carpet bag full of money. Also, as with the above, it is generally understood that people can be intrinsically Russian regardless of their citizenship, and that their fates are intertwined with the fate of the Russian government. <Backlash / Discrimination, depending on your political leanings> against overseas ethnic Russians post-2020 has cemented this.
America, in part due to ongoing polarization, has two separate proposals to two somewhat-separate bases of power.
To a degree, it is still a nation-state, and can claim that a wealthy America provides opportunities for people who are descendants of the historical American nation. This is a bit less intense than in the above two countries, since these Americans could renounce citizenship and become a fully-assimilated Australian/Spanish/Austrian within the span of one generation, if so inclined, but there is still a perception that the umbrella of American hegemony provides leverage to ordinary citizens. It’s this perception that keeps the pointy end of the U.S. military well-staffed.
The second proposal is as a somewhat international collective of elites, where they can come together to make sure the world remains a good place to do business, and negotiate with “rogue” actors from a shared position of strength. Everyone can attend the same fundraisers, invest in the same companies, and send their children to the same universities to network with each other. Notably, it’s this perception that allows the U.S. to arrange things like the stand-down that enabled the <Arrest / Kidnapping, depending on your political leanings> of Maduro by appealing to local elites who might want their kids to go to Harvard.
A shared language and some cultural overlap isn’t enough to create a nation—there have to be shared interests that motivate people to be willing to work and fight in the interest of the collective.
From what I’ve seen, there is a core political class in Europe which serves as the EU’s base of power and is glad to provide it with support in exchange for coordinating the funding of friendly NGOs and helping to oppose non-aligned political movements, but this is a relatively small group that does not enjoy universal popularity. To meaningfully counterbalance America, Russia, and China, there would need to be a common cause that a large number of people are willing to go above and beyond for—the sort of thing makes workers do more than they’re paid to do and makes soldiers willing to fight rather than rout. The usual motivation is something along the lines of “This nation is the exclusive property of all of your descendants, forever, and the blood and sweat you invest will never be lost to them”, but the Venn diagram of people advocating that for Europe and people who support the EU is very close to two nonintersecting circles.