If you aren’t starting with a prior of 0 or demanding a posterior of 1, what’s the problem?
Strictly speaking this isn’t the only way you can be not convinced. I can assign a non-zero prior to something even if there’s no evidence that can cause me to update. Pick some non-falsifiable hypothetical entity whose sole behavior is that it doesn’t interact with the universe in any testable way. I can consistently assign a non-zero probability to its existence (and in fact can consistently assign any probability I choose) but no matter what probability I start with you won’t be able to make me update my probability.
Not necessarily. For example, if I showed you a theory of physics that’s simpler if you postulate such an entity’s existence, you might very well update your estimate due to Occam’s razor.
This, incidentally, is what Eliezer’s argument for many worlds boils down to.
Strictly speaking this isn’t the only way you can be not convinced. I can assign a non-zero prior to something even if there’s no evidence that can cause me to update. Pick some non-falsifiable hypothetical entity whose sole behavior is that it doesn’t interact with the universe in any testable way. I can consistently assign a non-zero probability to its existence (and in fact can consistently assign any probability I choose) but no matter what probability I start with you won’t be able to make me update my probability.
Not necessarily. For example, if I showed you a theory of physics that’s simpler if you postulate such an entity’s existence, you might very well update your estimate due to Occam’s razor.
This, incidentally, is what Eliezer’s argument for many worlds boils down to.