Sure. But, to tie it back to what we were discussing before, that internalism is false when it comes to moral beliefs is not evidence against a projectivist and non-cognitivist thesis.
As a tentative aside—I’m not sure whether or not internalism is a necessary part of the anti-realist position. It seems conceivable that there could be preferences, desires or emotive dispositions that aren’t motivating at all. It certainly seems psychologically implausible- but it doesn’t follow that it is impossible.
Someone should do a series of qualitative interviews with VM cortex impaired patients. I’d like to know things like what “ought” means to them.
In a Bayesian sense, the falsity of internalism tends to weaken the case for projectivism and non-cognitivism, by taking away an otherwise promising line of support for them. Mackie’s argument from queerness relies upon it, for example.
Mackie conflates two aspects of queerness- motivation and direction, the latter of which remains even if motivational internalism is false. Second, that motivation can be detached from moral judgment in impaired brains doesn’t mean that moral facts don’t have a queer associate with motivation.
Sure. But, to tie it back to what we were discussing before, that internalism is false when it comes to moral beliefs is not evidence against a projectivist and non-cognitivist thesis.
As a tentative aside—I’m not sure whether or not internalism is a necessary part of the anti-realist position. It seems conceivable that there could be preferences, desires or emotive dispositions that aren’t motivating at all. It certainly seems psychologically implausible- but it doesn’t follow that it is impossible.
Someone should do a series of qualitative interviews with VM cortex impaired patients. I’d like to know things like what “ought” means to them.
In a Bayesian sense, the falsity of internalism tends to weaken the case for projectivism and non-cognitivism, by taking away an otherwise promising line of support for them. Mackie’s argument from queerness relies upon it, for example.
Mackie conflates two aspects of queerness- motivation and direction, the latter of which remains even if motivational internalism is false. Second, that motivation can be detached from moral judgment in impaired brains doesn’t mean that moral facts don’t have a queer associate with motivation.