In a Bayesian sense, the falsity of internalism tends to weaken the case for projectivism and non-cognitivism, by taking away an otherwise promising line of support for them. Mackie’s argument from queerness relies upon it, for example.
Mackie conflates two aspects of queerness- motivation and direction, the latter of which remains even if motivational internalism is false. Second, that motivation can be detached from moral judgment in impaired brains doesn’t mean that moral facts don’t have a queer associate with motivation.
In a Bayesian sense, the falsity of internalism tends to weaken the case for projectivism and non-cognitivism, by taking away an otherwise promising line of support for them. Mackie’s argument from queerness relies upon it, for example.
Mackie conflates two aspects of queerness- motivation and direction, the latter of which remains even if motivational internalism is false. Second, that motivation can be detached from moral judgment in impaired brains doesn’t mean that moral facts don’t have a queer associate with motivation.