Does it imply that all possible minds find the experience of eating ice cream more delicious than being beaten by gorillas with metal bars? For that would be untrue!
I question the assumption of error theorists that statements like the first have such expansive meaning, I hadn’t meant to change the variable you pointed out—the reason for the preference.
My understanding is that when someone talks about matters of preference, the default assumption is that they are referring to their own, or possibly the aggregate preferences of their peer group, in part because there is little or nothing that can be said about the aggregate preferences of all possible minds.
Does it imply that all possible minds find the experience of eating ice cream more delicious than being beaten by gorillas with metal bars? For that would be untrue!
I question the assumption of error theorists that statements like the first have such expansive meaning, I hadn’t meant to change the variable you pointed out—the reason for the preference.
My understanding is that when someone talks about matters of preference, the default assumption is that they are referring to their own, or possibly the aggregate preferences of their peer group, in part because there is little or nothing that can be said about the aggregate preferences of all possible minds.