It seems to me that the unfamiliarity of the scenario is preventing you from harnessing some perfectly standard moral intuitions. Let’s suppose, instead, that we have a Mark 1 human running on ordinary carbon, who announces his intention to be a hermit off in the woods and never speak to anyone again. Further, he says, he will need regular supplies of apples so as to avoid scurvy. Would you, on the grounds that this person has value in himself, go to the appointed spot every week with a bag of apples? If not, why would you supply the em with electricity? I observe in passing that some cultures have indeed supplied their holy hermits with regular offerings, but it is not clear to me that they did so while never seeing the hermit or receiving a blessing from him.
Now, if the em is not demanding charity but is running on electricity he owns, then the question seems quite different. In that case the observation “nobody will know the difference” is factually wrong: At least two people will know that they live in a culture in which contracts or property rights are not always respected when the owner is not there to defend his rights. There are all kinds of good reasons not to take any steps towards such a society, which have nothing to do with the value of any particular em.
Would you, on the grounds that this person has value in himself, go to the appointed spot every week with a bag of apples?
I would see this as a potential charitable act, in competition with other charities. As such it’s not particularly efficient: my time plus a bag of apples weekly to keep him free of scurvy is nowhere near as good as something like the AMF or SCI.
So perhaps the value of keeping him living is too low for the cost, and similarly we could have this for an emulated person. But the important thing is that they do have a value independent of their effect on others, and there may be cases where supporting emulations could be the most effective charity.
It’s still a problem, in that valuing a computational process remains somewhat bizarre. Questions like whether it’s still valuable to run exactly identical copies or rerun the same computation repeatedly from the same state just don’t come up with people.
It seems to me that the unfamiliarity of the scenario is preventing you from harnessing some perfectly standard moral intuitions. Let’s suppose, instead, that we have a Mark 1 human running on ordinary carbon, who announces his intention to be a hermit off in the woods and never speak to anyone again. Further, he says, he will need regular supplies of apples so as to avoid scurvy. Would you, on the grounds that this person has value in himself, go to the appointed spot every week with a bag of apples? If not, why would you supply the em with electricity? I observe in passing that some cultures have indeed supplied their holy hermits with regular offerings, but it is not clear to me that they did so while never seeing the hermit or receiving a blessing from him.
Now, if the em is not demanding charity but is running on electricity he owns, then the question seems quite different. In that case the observation “nobody will know the difference” is factually wrong: At least two people will know that they live in a culture in which contracts or property rights are not always respected when the owner is not there to defend his rights. There are all kinds of good reasons not to take any steps towards such a society, which have nothing to do with the value of any particular em.
I would see this as a potential charitable act, in competition with other charities. As such it’s not particularly efficient: my time plus a bag of apples weekly to keep him free of scurvy is nowhere near as good as something like the AMF or SCI.
So perhaps the value of keeping him living is too low for the cost, and similarly we could have this for an emulated person. But the important thing is that they do have a value independent of their effect on others, and there may be cases where supporting emulations could be the most effective charity.
Well, there you go then: Now we have a standard problem in efficient charity. No new intuitions required.
It’s still a problem, in that valuing a computational process remains somewhat bizarre. Questions like whether it’s still valuable to run exactly identical copies or rerun the same computation repeatedly from the same state just don’t come up with people.